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NOTE
TRADEMARK REGULATIONS AND THE COMMERCIAL
SPEECH DOCTRINE: FOCUSING ON THE
REGULATORY OBJECTIVE TO CLASSIFY
SPEECH FOR FIRST
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
John V. Tait
INTRODUCTION
Freedom of speech has been curtailed by the commercial speech
doctrine for the past fifty years.' Speech analyzed under this doctrine
is afforded less constitutional protection than non-commercial
speech.2 The doctrine, toted as a sword to strike a blow to unscrupu-
lous business transactions for the protection of unwary consumers,
has become a conduit by which the government has funneled restric-
tions censuring speech it finds undesirable.4 One example of this type
of government censorship is the over-regulation of offensive
trademarks.'
All fifty states, as well as the federal government, regulate the regis-
tration of scandalous, immoral, or indecent trademarks.6 When a
state requires approval of a trademark before the product may be sold
or displayed, the First Amendment is implicated because speech
which has not received prior governmental approval may be com-
pletely banned.7 In addition, some states have regulations that ban
signs or labels containing obscene or indecent trademarks altogether.'
Such restrictions directly conflict with the First Amendment.'
1. See infra Part II.
2. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76
Va. L. Rev. 627, 631 (1990).
3. See Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Liberating Conmnercial Speech: Product
Labeling Controls and the First Amendment, 47 Fla. L. Rev. 63, 75 (1995).
4. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 2, at 653 (arguing that the commercial
speech doctrine "gives [the] government a powerful weapon to suppress or control
speech by classifying it as merely commercial"); The Supreme Court, 1992 Term:
Leading Cases, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 144, 233 n.62 (1993) ("[The danger is that the
unequal status of commercial speech threatens to drag some fully protected speech
down to the reduced level of protection afforded by Central Hudson."). For a discus-
sion of the Central Hudson case, see infra notes 195-202 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part III (discussing cases that challenged such regulations).
6. See infra notes 82 & 94.
7. See infra notes 94-109 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 109.
9. Cf In re Mavety Media Group Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (find-
ing that the First Amendment is not implicated where the failure to register a mark
does not preclude its use).
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Often a label or advertisement is not approved for purely "commer-
cial reasons," such as a risk that consumers may misidentify the prod-
uct, 10 or that the label or advertisement might mislead consumers
about the product's ingredients, a1 use, 12 dangers, 13 origin,'4 manufac-
turer,'5 or the terms of the transaction itself.' 6 This Note does not
discuss the implications and justifications of trademark restrictions en-
acted for purely commercial reasons. Rather, this Note focuses on
government foreclosure of the distribution of a label's or advertise-
ment's message, whether by directly banning the label or by refusing
to approve the label where approval is required before the product
may be distributed, simply because the government finds the trade-
mark or trade name to be scandalous, profane, immoral, or indecent.
The First Amendment prohibits the government from censoring
non-commercial speech because the government considers it scandal-
ous, immoral, or indecent.' 7 The government should not be able to
circumvent this constitutional protection by simply labeling the speech
"commercial."18 This Note argues that courts should not analyze
10. See 27 C.F.R. § 5.34(a) (1998) (restricting labels that create an erroneous "im-
pression[ ] as to the age, origin, identity, or other characteristics of the product").
11. See id. In the context of alcohol, courts have interpreted this statute to include
any labels which are misleading as to "the nature of the contents of the beverage, i.e.,
the quality, quantity and physical characteristics of the alcoholic beverage within the
container bearing the label." Cabo Distrib. Co. v. Brady, 821 F. Supp. 601, 614 (N.D.
Cal. 1992) (emphasis omitted).
12. See Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 71 (D.D.C.
1998).
13. See id. at 69.
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)-(f) (1994). A trademark that is primarily a geographi-
cally descriptive term cannot be registered under the Lanham Act if it has great po-
tential to mislead consumers. See id. The use of the trade name "Durango" for
chewing tobacco, for example, was found to be "primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive" and therefore non-registerable. In re Loew's Theatres, Inc., 769 F.2d
764, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1994) (barring registration of marks that are "likely,
when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, to
cause mistake, or to deceive").
16. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
574 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Permissible restraints on commercial speech
have been limited to measures designed to protect consumers from fraudulent, mis-
leading, or coercive sales techniques."); see also infra note 306.
17. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) (plurality opinion) (find-
ing that "the fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for
suppressing it"); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive
or disagreeable." (citations omitted)).
18. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 2, at 653 (arguing that the government may
"suppress or control speech by classifying it as merely commercial"); see also Rubin v.
Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 492 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that
a truthful statement "would receive full First Amendment protection in any other
context; without some justification tailored to the special character of commercial
speech, the Government should not be able to suppress the same truthful speech
merely because it happens to appear on the label of a product for sale"); Linmark
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trademark 9 regulations as regulations on commercial speech without
an analysis of the purpose underlying the regulation in question. Reg-
ulations that do not address commercial harms20 must be subjected to
full First Amendment scrutiny."' Part I of this Note explores what
trademarks are and how society uses them. Part I also examines how
a person or business establishes a trademark. Part II analyzes the pro-
tections afforded to non-commercial speech under the First Amend-
ment and examines the justifications for some censorship of speech.
Further, part II traces the development of the commercial speech doc-
trine, from its first appearance as a mere footnote in Valentine v.
Chrestensen22 to its present day, extensive four-part test as construed
in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,23 which parses out the Court's
struggle with the justifications for denying commercial speech full con-
stitutional protection. Part III examines how courts have dealt with
trademarks and their place within the commercial speech doctrine. Fi-
nally, part IV looks at the various non-commercial traits contained
within trademarks. This Note concludes that regulations that do not
address commercial harms should be subject to strict scrutiny under
the First Amendment.
I. TRADEMARKS
This part examines the history of trademarks and how they are used
in today's society. Further, this part looks at the development of
Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 91 (1977) (reaffirming the Court's
"dissatisfaction with the... approach of resolving a class of First Amendment claims
simply by categorizing the speech as 'commercial"' (citation omitted)). The Court
has held that even commercial offensive and profane commercial speech has value
that needs to be protected. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) ("Advertising, however tasteless and ex-
cessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information . .. ").
19. The term "trademark," as originally employed at common law, described only
inherently distinctive designations or marks. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Com-
petition § 9 cmt. d (1995). On the other hand, the term "trade name" was used to
denote other designations, such as names or descriptive terms to distinguish one good
from another. See id. § 12 cmt. 9. The Lanham Act and the Model State Trademark
Bill limit the term "trademark" to marks used to identify a source of goods, and the
term "trade name" to identify the name of a company or enterprise. See infra notes
82, 94. This Note will use the terms "mark," "trademark," and "trade name"
interchangeably.
20. This Note will use the term "commercial harm" to mean fraudulent, mislead-
ing, or coercive sales techniques, or any other act or omission designed to interfere
with the fair bargaining process.
21. Under this view, the term "commercial speech doctrine" is a misnomer.
Rather, the correct term to use is the "commercial harm regulation doctrine," because
not only is it the regulation that determines the standard of review, as opposed to the
speech itself, but also only when the regulation is aimed at the prevention of a com-
mercial harm is the application of the more permissive constitutional analysis
warranted.
22. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
23. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
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trademark law over the past century as both Congress and the courts
have recognized the need to protect trademarks. Finally this part out-
lines the trademark regulation process.
A. History of Trademarks
For thousands of years, symbols have been used to identify owner-
ship or origin of products.24 Engravings identifying stonecutters are
imbedded in the Egyptian structures dating from 4000 B.C.2 Cave
paintings show that animals were marked with brandings on their
flanks to identify ownership.26 In fact, the word "brand" is derived
from the Anglo-Saxon verb meaning "to burn."27 This verb survives
in the term "brand name."28 While the purpose of branding cattle was
to identify their owners,29 another justification for placing a distin-
guishing mark on a product was to indicate shoddy workmanship.30
For example, in ancient China, sword and armory makers had to put
their mark on each piece of their work, so that if the equipment was
faulty, its makers could be held responsible.' Over the years, the use
of marks became a vehicle by which consumers could identify good
workmanship. 2
B. What is a Trademark?
A trademark is any combination of words, symbols, or package de-
signs used to distinguish a good or service produced by one manufac-
turer from the goods or services of other manufacturers. 3
Trademarks include brand names that identify goods ("McDonald's"),
service marks that identify services ("The Four Seasons" for a restau-
rant service), certification marks identifying goods or services meeting
certain qualifications ("UL" for appliances meeting the safety stan-
dards of Underwriters Laboratories, Inc.), and collective marks identi-
fying goods, services, or members of an organization ("Plumbers and
Steamfitters Local 201").31 The function of a trademark is to allow
consumers to identify the source of the article to which the trademark
24. See 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 5:1 (2d ed.
1984).
25. See Preserving History: Trademark Timeline, 82 Trademark Rep. 1021, 1022
(1992).
26. See id.
27. See Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 Trade-
mark Rep. 265, 267 (1975).
28. See id.
29. See id. at 273.
30. See McCarthy, supra note 24, § 5:1.
31. See id.
32. See 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition
§ 5.01 (3d ed. 1996).
33. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
34. See Jane C. Ginsburg et al., Trademark and Unfair Competition Law 44-45 (2d
ed. 1996).
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is affixed.35 Consumers can be confident that in purchasing a product
bearing a particular trademark that is favorably regarded, the product
will be of high quality.3 6 Trademarks protect the reputation of a com-
pany and the resulting goodwill, while reducing the costs to consumers
of finding desirable products.37 Without trademarks, consumers
would have a difficult time identifying the origin of a product or ser-
vice, and a company could not capitalize on its good reputation.3
C. History of Trademark Regulations
Market growth during the industrial revolution increased the need
for products to carry distinguishable marks.39 The growth of refined
production methods displaced the manufacturing work of older times
and increased production output.4 0 As manufacturers expanded into
areas outside of their locale, the need to advertise in order to acquaint
consumers with the product increased.4 Hence, the need for the
product to carry a mark also increased.4 2 Faced with the necessity of
preventing fraud and deceit, courts developed a common law tort of
using another's mark for one's own.43
In 1870, Congress passed the first trademark registration act, enti-
tled "An Act to Revise, Consolidate, and Amend the Statutes Relat-
ing to Patents and Copyrights."'  Nine years later, in Trade-mark
35. See S. Rep. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274
(suggesting that the goal of trademarks is "to protect the public so it may be confident
that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trademark which it favorably knows,
it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get"); Ginsburg et al., supra note
34, at 44 ("A 'trademark' is a word logo or package design, or a combination of them,
used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify its goods and distinguish them from
others."); see also Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916) (ob-
serving that the "primary and proper function of a trade-mark is to identify the origin
or ownership of the article to which it is affixed").
36. See John D. Oathout, Trademarks 34 (1981); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L & Econ. 265, 269-70
(1987).
37. See Siegrun D. Kane, Trademark Law: A Practitioner's Guide 40 (3d ed.
1997); Landes & Posner, supra note 36, at 269-70; cf. Noah D. Genel, Note, Keep it
Reak A Call For a Broader Quality Control Requirement in Trademark Law. 8 Ford-
ham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 269, 300 (1997) (arguing that trademarks linked
with products of a consistent quality reduce consumer search costs).
38. See Ginsburg et al., supra note 34, at 12; Richard L Kirkpatrick. Likelihood of
Confusion in Trademark Law § 1.2 (1996); Oathout, supra note 36, at 40.
39. See Diamond, supra note 27, at 280-81.
40. See id- at 280.
41. See id.
42. As one commentator observed, when the manufacturer "acquired a reputation
outside of his immediate locality, in order to visualize and perpetuate that reputation
he adopted and used a mark to distinguish his product from others. This maintained
the identity of the manufacturer's product through different hands of the middle-
man." Benjamin G. Paster, Trademarks-Their Early Histor,, 59 Trademark Rep.
551, 552 (1969).
43. See McCarthy, supra note 24, § 5:2.
44. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 77-84, 16 Stat. 198, 210-12.
1998]
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Cases,4 5 the Supreme Court found the act unconstitutional because it
was beyond the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power. 6 In
1881, Congress passed another federal registration statute, limiting re-
gistration to trademarks used in commerce with foreign nations and
Indian tribes. 7 Congress passed a third trademark regulation statute
in 1905.48 This regulation proved to be inadequate, however, because
its coverage was limited to the registration of purely fanciful and arbi-
trary marks.4 9 Finally, in 1946, Congress enacted the statute currently
in force: the Lanham Act.5"
The purpose of the Lanham Act is to support competition in the
market by ensuring that the public is knowledgeable about the origin
of a product, thereby allowing companies to take advantage of good-
will and reputation.5 ' The Lanham Act also protects the owner of a
trademark by preventing others from reaping the benefits of the mark
or damaging the reputation associated with the mark.5" Under the
Act, the first company to use a mark becomes the senior owner and
has superior rights to the mark over any subsequent junior owners. 3
Where the concurrent use of a mark will likely confuse consumers as
to the origin of the product or service, the senior owner of the mark
has an action for infringement. 4 Further, two marks need not be
identical to be actionable. The senior owner of a mark has the right
to preclude the further use of a similar mark by a junior owner that
causes or is likely to cause confusion of the product's origin, associa-
45. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
46. See id. at 97-99. The Court also held that the Patent and Copyright Clause of
the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, does not cover trade-
marks. See id. at 93-94.
47. Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502, 502 (repealed 1946).
48. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724 (repealed 1946).
49. See id. Further, under this statute, no one could register descriptive marks,
marks made up of primarily geographic terms, or marks named after individuals,
firms, or corporations. See McCarthy, supra note 24, § 5:3.
50. Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)).
51. The rationale for the protection of trademarks was articulated by the Senate
Committee on Patents in its Report on the Lanham Act:
Trade-marks, indeed, are the essence of competition, because they make
possible a choice between competing articles by enabling the buyer to distin-
guish one from the other. Trade-marks encourage the maintenance of qual-
ity by securing to the producer the benefit of the good reputation which
excellence creates. To protect trade-marks, therefore, is to protect the pub-
lic from deceit, to foster fair competition, and to secure to the business com-
munity the advantages of reputation and good will by preventing their
diversion from those who have created them to those who have not.
S. Rep. No. 79-1333, at 4 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275.
52. See Ginsburg et al., supra note 34, at 12.
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994); Ginsburg et al., supra note 34, at 45-46.
54. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114.
55. See Ginsburg et al., supra note 34, at 46.
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tion, sponsorship, or endorsement to an appreciable number of
consumers.
56
For example, in the 1988 case of Quality Inns International, Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp.,57 McDonald's sought an injunction against the
Quality Inn hotel chain from using the mark "McSleep Inn" on a
chain of economy hotels.5 McDonald's claimed that this slogan in-
fringed upon McDonald's registered trademark and constituted a false
designation of origin or a false description or representation of serv-
ices as being associated with McDonald's. 9 McDonald's owned a
family of marks, each a combination of the prefix "Mc" with a generic
word, and it argued that the mark "McSleep Inn" would cause confu-
sion among consumers as to the hotel's owners and damage McDon-
ald's goodwill and reputation.6' In determining whether the mark was
an infringement, the court considered several factors, including: (1)
the evidence of confusion between the marks in question; (2) the simi-
larity of the contexts of the marks' uses, including the similarity of
facilities and media forms in which the marks are presented; (3) the
proximity of the markets for the products; and (4) the intent behind
Quality Inns's adoption of the mark.6 The court found that there was
a likelihood of confusion between the "McSleep Inn" mark and Mc-
Donald's marks, constituting an infringement on McDonald's marks
and warranting a permanent injunction against Quality Inns from us-
ing the "McSleep Inn" mark.62
Congress supplemented the Lanham Act with the introduction of
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 ("Dilution Act"). 63 The
56. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2).
57. 695 F. Supp. 198 (D. Md. 1988).
58. See id at 201.
59. See id
60. See id
61. See id. at 217. Different courts have developed different tests for determining
trademark infringement. For example, the Second Circuit has developed a list of nine
factors to consider, including: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the similarity between
the two marks; (3) the similarity of the products; (4) the likelihood that the senior
owner will bridge the gap; (5) actual confusion; (6) the good faith of the junior user in
adopting the mark; (7) the quality of the junior user's product; (8) the sophistication
of buyers; and (9) the relative harm to the parties if an injunction is granted. See
Chandon Champagne Corp. v. San Marino Wine Corp., 335 F.2d 531, 536 (2d Cir.
1964); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961); Mc-
Donald's Corp. v. McBagel's Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268, 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
62. See Quality Inns, 695 F. Supp. at 221-22. One factor the court considered in
concluding that the marks were confusingly similar was the results of surveys in which
respondents were asked to identify the company behind the "McSleep Inn" mark. See
id. at 207-09, 218. Although the parties disputed the accuracy of the surveys, the court
found that even the minimum estimate that 16.3% of the public was confused as to
,who was the owner of the mark "McSleep Inn" constituted "an appreciable number
that cannot be dismissed." Id at 219.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (Supp. 111996). One of the reasons Congress had passed the
Dilution Act was to conform to international law. As United States Senator Patrick J.
Leahy observed:
19981
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Dilution Act is similar to state anti-dilution statutes' that prevent
subsequent users of a mark from lessening the uniqueness of the
mark, even in the absence of any likelihood of consumer confusion.65
Dilution is the "whittling away of an established trade-mark's selling
power and value through its unauthorized use by others upon dissimi-
lar products. '66 Dilution occurs when the mark's propensity for bring-
ing to mind a particular product or service is reduced.6 v While
confusion of one product for another is an immediate harm, "dilution
is an infection which, if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the
advertising value of the mark. 68
A prime example of how trademark law protects against dilution is
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey
Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet, Inc. ,69 which af-
firmed a District Court's decision enjoining a car dealership from us-
ing a variation of Ringling Brothers's "The Greatest Show on Earth"
trademark.7 1 Celozzi-Ettelson's version of the trademark was its use
of the phrase: "The Greatest Used Car Show on Earth. '71 The court
found that even though there was no likelihood of confusion between
the origin of the two products, Ringling Brothers would nonetheless
suffer irreparable harm because its trademark would lose its distinc-
tiveness. 72 The court concluded that an injunction was warranted be-
We intend for this legislation to strengthen the hand of our international
negotiators from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the De-
partment of Commerce as they press for bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments to secure greater protection for the world famous marks of our U.S.
companies. Foreign countries should no longer argue that we do not protect
our marks from dilution, or seek to excuse their own inaction against prac-
tices that are destructive of the distinctiveness of U.S. marks within their
borders.
2 Jerome Gilson, Trademark Protection and Practice § 5.12(1) (1998) (quoting Sena-
tor Patrick J. Leahy).
64. See, e.g., Cal Bus. & Prof. Code § 14330 (West 1987); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 35-11i (West 1997); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 495.151 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998); 765 Ill.
Comp. Stat. Ann. 1036/65 (West Supp. 1998); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:223.1 (West
1987); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1530 (West 1997); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. l1OB, § 12
(Law. Co-op. 1995); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 417.061 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998); Mont. Code
Ann. § 30-13-334 (1997); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 87-122 (1994); 54 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1124
(1996 & Supp. 1998); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 16.29 (West Supp. 1998); Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. § 19.77.160 (West Supp. 1998).
65. See Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d
1162, 1165-66 (N.Y. 1977).
66. Id. at 1164 (quoting N.Y. Legis. Ann. 49 (1954)).
67. See id.
68. Mortellito v. Nina of Cal., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see
also Hearings Before the House Comm. on Patents, 72nd Cong. 15 (1932) (statement
of Frank I. Schechter) ("If you allow Rolls Royce restaurants and Rolls Royce cafete-
rias, and Rolls Royce pants, and Rolls Royce candy, in 10 years you will not have the
Rolls Royce mark any more.").
69. 855 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1988).
70. See id. at 481.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 485.
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cause "the very nature of dilution, insidiously gnawing away at the
value of a mark, makes the injury 'remarkably difficult to convert into
damages." "
D. The Regulation Process
A company need not register a trademark in order to have exclusive
protectable rights over the mark.74 By using the mark in connection
with its goods, the company automatically acquires trademark rights
in the geographical area of use.75 If a mark is not registered, the
owner may claim common law trademark rights to the mark by attach-
ing the symbol """ for trademarks and "sM" for service marks.76 As
long as the mark is not abandoned or does not lose its uniqueness by
becoming a generic term, the trademark rights will last forever.' Na-
tionwide and international trademark protection, however, is given
only to federally registered marks.78 For the first five years after a
mark is given a federal registration, the registration is prima facie evi-
dence of the registrant's exclusive right to use the mark in interstate
commerce; after five years, the presumption becomes conclusive. 9
In order to obtain federal registration under the Lanham Act, the
owner of a mark must fie an application with the United States Pat-
ent and Trademark Office based on either a bona fide intention to use
the mark in commerce or evidence indicating an actual use of the
mark in commerce.80 The application is then assigned to an Examin-
ing Attorney for processing." One of the components of this exami-
nation is to confirm that the trademark does not consist of immoral,
deceptive, or scandalous matter.' If the application for registration is
refused, the applicant may appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal
73. Id. at 484 (quoting Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 736 F.2d 1153, 1158 (7th
Cir. 1984)).
74. See Ginsburg et al., supra note 34, at 45.
75. See id
76. See id.
77. See id at 46. To determine if a mark has become a generic term, courts must
ascertain what the majority of consumers understand the term or mark to mean. If
the majority of the public believes that the principal significance of the term or mark
is the product itself, and not the producer, then the term or mark is considered ge-
neric. See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); McCarthy,
supra note 24, § 12:2.
78. Federal registrants are given nationwide constructive notice of their use and
ownership of the underlying mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (1994). For many interna-
tional rights, the time to measure the use of the trademark begins to run when one
receives a federal registration. See Ginsburg et al., supra note 34, at 47.
79. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1115(a); see also Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Registration of
Scandalous, Inunora, and Disparaging Matter under Section 2(a) of the LanhIam Act.
Can One Man's Vulgarity Be Another's Registered Trademark?, 54 Ohio St. L.J. 331,
332 n.2 (1993) (discussing the benefits of having a federally registered trademark).
80. See 37 C.F.R. § 2.33 (1998).
81. See 15 U.S.C. § 1062(a).
82. Section 2 of the Act provides in relevant part:
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Board. 3 If this proves unsuccessful, the applicant may further appeal
to either the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or
the District Court of Columbia.84 When an application is accepted,
the mark proposed for registration is published in the Official Gazette
of the Patent and Trademark Office." If owners of other marks be-
lieve that the mark proposed for registration will cause confusion with
their own marks, these owners may file an opposition in the Patent
and Trademark Office and bring proceedings against the mark before
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.86 The conclusion of the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board may be appealed to the Federal
Circuit or the District Court of Columbia. 7
After receiving a grant of registration, companies may begin to use
statutory trademark registration notices, such as the symbol "®" or
the words "Registered in U.S. Patent and Trademark Office."88 To
maintain this registration, the owner must file a declaration with the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office six years after a mark is registered,
stating that the mark is in bona fide use in commerce in the ordinary
course of trade."9 Thereafter, the mark's registration must be re-
newed every ten years.90
While purely in-state businesses cannot receive federal registration
for their trademarks, they may obtain state trademark registrations. 91
State registrations are generally cheaper to obtain, and they are issued
No trade-mark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished
from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal regis-
ter on account of its nature unless it-
(a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or
matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons,
living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into
contempt, or disrepute.
(b) Consists of or comprises the flag or coat of arms or other insignia of
the United States, or any State or municipality, or of any foreign nation, or
any simulation thereof.
(c) Consists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a
particular living individual except by his written consent, or the name, signa-
ture, or portrait of a deceased President of the United States during the life
of his widow, if any, except by the written consent of the widow.
Id. § 1052(a)-(c).
83. See id. § 1070.
84. See id. § 1071(a)-(b).
85. See 37 C.F.R. § 2.80 (1998).
86. See 15 U.S.C. § 1063; 37 C.F.R. § 2.101-07.
87. See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)-(b).
88. See id. § 1111.
89. See id. § 1058.
90. See id. § 1059.
91. See Ginsburg et al., supra note 34, at 45.
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more quickly than their federal counterparts.9 2 Federal registration
rights, however, take precedence over state registration rights.' 3
Most states have legislation restricting the registration of trade-
marks that are scandalous, immoral, or indecent.' In and of itself,
however, this does not pose a First Amendment problem; in many
circumstances, the failure to register a trademark or trade name, while
denying the prospective registrant the benefits of having the trade-
mark registered,9" does not preclude the use of such a mark. 6
92. See id.
93. See id.; see also 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition
§ 22:1 (2d ed. 1984) ("In many cases, a state registration may have little more than a
psychologically soothing effect on the owner.").
94. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 9 Statutory Note (1995).
The International Trademark Association prepared a Model State Trademark Bill re-
sembling the federal registration system. This bill provides the basis for most of the
current state legislation that restricts the registration of scandalous, immoral, or inde-
cent trademarks or trade names. See Ala. Code § 8-12-7 (1993); Alaska Stat.
§ 45.50.010 (Michie 1996); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1442 (1994); Ark. Code Ann. § 4-71-
104 (Michie 1996); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 14220 (West 1987): Colo. Rev. Stat. § 7-
70-108 (1997); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 35-18b (\Vest 1997); ill. § 35-11b; Del. Code
Ann. tit. 6, § 3303 (Michie 1993); Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-441 (1994); 765 I11. Comp.
Stat. Ann. 1036/10 (West Supp. 1998); Iowa Code Ann. § 548.102 (\Vest 1997): Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 81-112 (1997); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 365.567 (Michie 1996); La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 51:212 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10 § 1522 (West
1997 & Supp. 1997); Md. Code Ann., Bus. Reg. § 1-404 (1992); Mass. Ann. Lavs ch.
l0b, § 3 (Law. Co-op. 1995); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 429.32 (Vest 1995); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 333.19 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997); Miss. Code Ann. § 75-25-3 (1991 & Supp. 1998);
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 417.011 (\Vest 1990 & Supp. 1998); Mont. Code Ann. § 30-13-303
(1997); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 87-112 (1994); id. § 87-209 (1994 & Supp. 1997); id.
§ 600.330; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 350-A:2 (1995); NJ. Stat. Ann. § 56:3-13.2 (Vest 1989
& Supp. 1998); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-3B-4 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1998); N.Y. Gen.
Bus. Law § 360-a (McKinney 1998); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 80-2 (1997); N.D. Cent. Code
§ 47-22-02 (1978 & Supp. 1997); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 1329.55 (Anderson 1993);
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 78, § 22 (Vest 1995 & Supp. 1998); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 647.035
(1988); 54 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1111 (1996 & Supp. 1998); R.I. Gen. La\vs § 6-2-3 (1992);
S.C. Code Ann. § 39-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. Codified Laws § 37-6-6 (Michie
1994); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-502 (1995 & Supp. 1997); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code
Ann. § 16.08 (West 1987); Utah Code Ann. § 70-3-2 (1997); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9,
§ 2527 (1993); Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-92.3 (Michie 1998); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 19.77.020 (West 1989); W. Va. Code § 47-2-2 (1996); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-1-102
(Michie 1997).
95. There are several benefits having a mark federally registered. For example,
the owner enjoys nationwide constructive notice of use and ownership of the mark.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1072. Also, federal registration amounts to prima facie evidence of
the registrant's exclusive right to use the mark in interstate commerce and after five
years that presumption becomes conclusive. See id. § 1115(a). Further, a mark regis-
tered for five years can only be canceled under one of the narrow grounds specified in
15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).
96. In such an instance, the state is simply declining to extend the added protec-
tions afforded to a registered trademark. Trademark applications refused by the
United States Patent and Trademark Office on the ground that the trademark com-
prises immoral or scandalous matter under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) does not curtail First
Amendment freedoms, because "the PTO's refusal to register [a] mark does not affect
[one's] right to use it. No conduct is proscribed, and no tangible form of expression is
suppressed." In re Mavety Media Group Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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When a state refuses to approve a label or mark on a product where
such approval is required before the product may be sold, however,
the First Amendment is implicated because this refusal completely
prohibits any use of the trademark. Many states require permission to
use a label, brand name, or advertisement before the sale or manufac-
ture of many products, including fertilizer, 97 seed,98 pesticides,9 9 alco-
hol, 100 feed, 101 dairy products,'0 2 farm products and fish, 103 acid and
97. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 2-19-407 (Michie 1996) (soil amendment); Cal.
Food & Agric. Code § 14631 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996) (fertilizing material); Ga.
Code Ann. § 2-12-43 (1990 & Supp. 1998) (liming materials); id. § 2-12-4 (commercial
fertilizers); Idaho Code § 22-605 (1995) (commercial fertilizer); 505 Ill. Comp. Stat.
Ann. 120/15 (West 1993) (soil amendment); id. 80/4 (commercial fertilizer); Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 2-2804 (1991) (soil amendment); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 7, § 778 (West 1989)
(plant or soil amendment); Md. Code Ann., Agric. § 6-207 (1985 & Supp. 1997) (com-
mercial fertilizer and soil conditioner); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 324.8505 (West
Supp. 1998) (specialty fertilizers and soil conditioner); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 18C.411
(West 1998) (specialty fertilizers, soil amendments, and plant amendments); Miss.
Code Ann. § 69-24-9 (1991) (fertilizing material and additives); Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 266.165 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998) (commercial feeds); id. § 266.321 (commercial
fertilizer); Mont. Code Ann. § 80-10-201 (1997) (commercial fertilizer); N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 431:4 (1991 & Supp. 1997) (fertilizer); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 106-660 (1996)
(commercial fertilizer for tobacco, specialty fertilizer, fertilizer materials, manipulated
manure, and fortified mulch).
98. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 2-11-22 (1990 & Supp. 1998) (seeds); Neb. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 81-2,147.02 (1996) (seeds); N.D. Cent. Code § 4-09-10.1 (1987 & Supp.
1997) (agricultural seed).
99. See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 15-3-3.5-7 (Michie 1993) (pesticides); Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 18B.28 (West 1998) (pesticide control); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 586.500 (Michie
1994) (pesticides, caustic or corrosive substances, and alkalis).
100. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 28-7-10 (1986) (table wine importers); id. § 28-3A-7 (al-
coholic beverage importers); id. § 28-3A-6 (alcoholic beverage manufacturers); id.
§ 28-7-11 (table wine manufacturers); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 30-95 (West 1990 &
1998) (liquor advertising and bottling); id. § 30-95a (West 1990) (display of trade-
marks); Ga. Code Ann. § 3-6-22 (1990) (wine); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 436.31b(5)
(West 1995 & Supp. 1998) (brewpub license); Miss. Code Ann. § 27-71-307 (1990 &
Supp. 1998) (light wines and beer); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 178:24 (1994 & Supp. 1997)
(liquor license); N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 107-a (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1998)
(containers of alcoholic beverages); N.D. Cent. Code § 5-03-01.2 (Supp. 1998) (alco-
holic beverages); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 9, § 84.3 (1997) (brand label); id.
§ 84.7 (1995) (cider labels).
101. See, e.g., Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 19357 (West 1986) (horsemeat and pet
food); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 22-118b (West 1985 & Supp. 1998) (commercial and
customer-formula feeds); Del. Code Ann. tit. 3, § 1704 (1993) (commercial feed);
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 144-3 (1993) (commercial feed); Idaho Code § 25-2718 (1990 &
Supp. 1997) (commercial feed); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3:1893 (West 1987) (commercial
feed); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 128, § 52 (Law. Co-op. 1997) (commercial feed); Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 287.524 (West 1996) (commercial feed); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 76-19-
4 (Michie 1990) (commercial feeds); N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 130 (McKinney 1991)
(commercial feed); N.D. Cent. Code § 19-13.1-03 (1997) (pet food and commercial
feed).
102. See, e.g., Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 32912.5 (West 1986 & Supp. 1998) (fed-
eral labeling requirements); id. § 36674(a) (sweeteners); id. § 38951 (products resem-
bling milk products); id. § 39906 (dairy beverages); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 22-135(a)
(West 1986 & Supp. 1998) (milk and milk products).
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corrosive products, 1' 4 petroleum products,"0 5 drugs and cosmetics, 10 6
and others. 10 7 Along with the more general restrictions on registra-
tion of scandalous, immoral, or deceptive trademarks,108 some state
statutes completely ban signs or labels containing an obscene or inde-
cent trademark or brand name, whether registered or not.' 9
Whenever statutes regulating trademarks are challenged under the
First Amendment, it is crucial for the court hearing the case to deter-
mine whether the purpose of the statute is to regulate either commer-
cial speech or non-commercial speech. This is because courts must
give much greater deference to statutes abridging purely commercial
speech. The next section of this Note examines the history of the
commercial speech doctrine and its significant distinctions from non-
commercial speech.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the
103. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 2-11-53 (1977 & Supp. 1997) (farm products and fish);
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 585.93(7) (1987 & Supp. 1998) (inspection of nontraditional live-
stock); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 29.031 (West 1998) (poultry).
104. See, eg., Ala. Code § 8-17-23 (1993) (caustic or corrosive substances); Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-1104 (West 1993) (caustic alkalies and acids); Del. Code Ann. tit.
16, § 2303(a) (1995) (caustic alkali, acids, or corrosive substances); Miss. Code Ann.
§ 41-29-15 (1993) (caustic poisons); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 339"53 (1993 & Supp. 1997)
(caustic potash, oxalic acid, etc.); N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Laws § 172-b (McKinney 1991)
(lye and other caustic substances).
105. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-150 (1994) (approval of substitutes or improv-
ers of fuels or other motor fuels).
106. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 499.015 (Vest 1997 & Supp. 1998) (drugs, devices,
and cosmetics); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:627 (\Vest 1992) (processed foods, proprie-
tary or patent medicines, prophylactic devices, and cosmetics); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 436:80 (1991) (biological products and diagnostic reagents products for animals).
107. See. e.g., Ala. Code § 32-5C-5 (1989 & Supp. 1997) (window tinting); Cal. Bus.
& Prof. Code § 19081 (West 1997) (home furnishing); Cal. Penal Code § 2883 (West
1982) (prison-made goods); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 29-155(a) (West 1990) (private
detectives); Ga. Code Ann. § 43-11-47(a) (1994 & Supp. 1998) (dental practice
licenses); Mich. Comp. Laws § 338.843 (1997) (private detectives); id. § 338.1073
(1997) (private security guards); Miss. Code Ann. § 63-7-59(1) (1996) (window tint-
ing); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 401:15 (1998) (incorporation of insurance companies);
N.D. Cent. Code § 19-16.1-03 (1997) (antifreeze).
108. See supra note 94.
109. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 13A-12-131 (1994) (prohibiting public display of obscene
bumper stickers, signs, or writings); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 5402 (West 1990) (ban-
ning obscene words or pictures on advertising structures or signs); Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Code § 25612 (West 1997) (prohibiting obnoxious, gaudy, blatant or offensive signs
used in connection with any retailer of alcoholic beverages); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 712-
1211 (1993) (banning the display of indecent matter); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs.
tit. 9, § 83.3(c)(2)(iii) (1995) (prohibiting obscene, indecent, obnoxious, or offensive
signs from appearing in the windows of retailers of alcoholic beverages); Okla. Stat.
tit. 37, § 515(3) (1990) (preventing the use of obscene or indecent statements on alco-
holic beverage labels); Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-187 (1993 & Supp. 1997) (banning
obscene or patently offensive window signs, bumper stickers, or other markings).
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people peaceably to assembly, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."' 10 Congress does, however, make laws abridg-
ing the expression of speech.111 When these laws are challenged as
violations of the First Amendment, and such cases reach the Supreme
Court, the Court analyzes the constitutionality of the speech regula-
tion by first deciding whether the speech receives any constitutional
protection at all.1 12 If the speech receives no protection, then the reg-
ulation passes constitutional muster.1 1 3 When speech is within the
purview of the First Amendment, however, the Court generally per-
forms a balancing test to determine whether the regulation is constitu-
tionally permissible.1 4 The burden is on the government to
demonstrate its interest in banning or restricting the speech.t 1 5 The
degree of interest the government must show ranges from "impor-
tant"'1 16 to "compelling" '117 to "substantial" '118 to "strong,"'1 9 depend-
ing on what type of speech is at issue.
Although a thorough examination of First Amendment jurispru-
dence is beyond the scope of this Note, this part will outline the differ-
110. U.S. Const. amend. I.
111. See Owen M. Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech 5 (1996); cf. John E. Nowak &
Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 939 (1991) (stating that the First Amend-
ment does not prevent the abridgement of speech, but rather the abridgement of the
freedom of speech (citing A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self Gov-
ernment 19 (1948))).
112. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-62 (1976).
113. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 (1989) ("We
have repeatedly held that the protection of the First Amendment does not extend to
obscene speech." (citing Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973))).
114. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 91 (1997)
(finding that, regardless of whether speech is commercial or noncommercial, "a court
may not escape the task of assessing the First Amendment interest at stake and
weighing it against the public interest allegedly served by the regulation" (quoting
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975))); Darrien A. McWhirter, Exploring the
Constitution Series: Freedom of Speech, Press, and Assembly 6 (1994).
115. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993).
116. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) ("This Court has held that
when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct,
a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.").
117. Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 126 (observing that the government may
"regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a com-
pelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated inter-
est"); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (observing that the government
must have a "compelling" interest to justify an incidental burden on the exercise of
free speech).
118. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 573
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (observing that the government must have a "sub-
stantial" interest to suppress commercial speech).
119. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (observing the level
of governmental interest necessary to justify an incidental limitation on the First
Amendment has included compelling, substantial, subordinating, paramount, cogent,
and strong).
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ence between the protections enjoyed by non-commercial and
commercial speech, particularly when the government seeks to ban
speech it considers offensive.
A. Non-Commercial Speech
If speech is non-commercial, it may be banned only if it fits within
one of several doctrinal categories. 121 Otherwise, regulation of the
non-commercial speech must survive either strict or intermediate
scrutiny, depending on the type of regulation. Regulations based on
the content of speech are given strict scrutiny by courts.12' Regula-
tions restricting the time, place, and manner in which speech can be
delivered, independent of the content of the speech, are given inter-
mediate scrutiny." 2
Several forms of speech receive no protection under the First
Amendment. For example, speech that is "obscene" may be restricted
by the government."2 Not all speech that is offensive, however, is
"obscene." For example, in Miller v. California,-12 4 the Court articu-
lated a three-part test to determine if speech is "obscene," thereby
making it permissible for the government to completely ban the
speech.125 The test required a determination of:
120. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 399 (1992) (White. J., concurring)
(observing that "expression falling within certain limited categories so lacks the values
the First Amendment was designed to protect that the Constitution affords no protec-
tion to that expression" (citations omitted)); see also Cohen v. California. 403 U.S. 15,
20 (1971) (noting that "fighting words" may be banned (citing Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942))); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 635 (1968)
(concluding that "[o]bscenity is not within the area of protected speech or press" (ci-
tations omitted)).
121. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395.
122. Regulations restricting the time, place, and manner of speech in public places
must be narrowly tailored to serve a "substantial enough governmental interest."
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 n.8 (1984). Also,
these regulations must "leave open ample alternative channels for communication of
the information." Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 516 (1981)
(quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)). Regulations restricting the time, place, and manner of
speech not delivered in a public forum are subject to less scrutiny. If impairment of
the speech is not substantial, the government must merely show that the regulation is
rational. See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 982 (2d ed. 1988).
123. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 596 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (finding that "it
is well established that the government may regulate obscenity even though it [sic]
does not present a clear and present danger"), Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973);
cf Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2346 (1997) ("[W]here obscenity is not involved,
we have consistently held that the fact that protected speech may be offensive to some
does not justify its suppression." (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678, 701 (1977))).
124. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
125. See id- at 24. The Court specifically rejected a test consisting of an inquiry into
whether the speech was "utterly without redeeming social value." Id. at 24-25 (quot-
ing Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966)).
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(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.'
26
Speech considered to be nothing more than "fighting words" also
receives no protection. 27 The Supreme Court has defined "fighting
words" to mean words "which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.' 1 28 The Court has
concluded that "fighting words" are of such slight social value that any
benefit garnished from them is outweighed by the "social interest in
order and morality.' '1 29
Although the government may regulate obscene speech and "fight-
ing words," it cannot place a ban on certain words merely as a
smokescreen for banning objectionable ideas. For example, in Kings-
ley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of New
York, 130 the Supreme Court reversed a New York Court of Appeals
decision that allowed New York, via the Motion Picture Division of
the New York Education Department, to deny a license to a film dis-
tributor wanting to exhibit a particular motion picture.' 3' New York
had banned the movie Lady Chatterley's Lover because it presented
adultery and fornication as an acceptable form of behavior, 132 which,
the state argued, was "contrary to the moral standards, the religious
precepts, and the legal code of its citizenry." 133 The Court rejected
the state's argument, finding the ban to be a restriction of ideas and
therefore invalid under the First Amendment. 134
Further, speech cannot be banned merely because its message is
profane.135 In Cohen v. California,'3 6 the Supreme Court found that
profane and offensive language is protected by the First Amend-
126. Id. at 24 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
127. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-73 (1942).
128. Id. at 572 (citation omitted).
129. Id.
130. 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
131. See id. at 685.
132. See id. at 687.
133. Id. at 688.
134. See id. at 689 (observing that the First Amendment guarantee "is not confined
to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority").
135. See supra note 17; see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) ("As a
general matter, we have indicated that in public debate our own citizens must tolerate
insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate 'breathing space'
to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment." (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)). But see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)
(holding that words including "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and
the insulting or 'fighting' words" can be censored by the government).
136. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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ment. 37 In reversing the defendant's conviction for wearing a jacket
in a Los Angeles County courthouse bearing the words "Fuck the
Draft," the Court held that the state could not ban vulgar language for
the purpose of sheltering the public from offensive speech.1 3s The
Court specifically rejected the argument that the viewers, which in-
cluded women and children, 39 were a captive audience.140 The Court
found that those who objected to the jacket's message could "avoid
further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their
eyes.'
14
'
In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,4 2 the Court struck down a city
ordinance that prohibited drive-in theaters from showing films con-
taining nudity when the screen was visible from a public street or
place.143 The Court found that when the government, "acting as a
censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of
speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others, the
First Amendment strictly limits its power."14' Before speech may be
banned, the Court reasoned, it must first be found to be obtrusive to
the point of being impossible for individuals to avoid being subjected
to it.'45 Although, as Chief Justice Burger noted, the drive-in movie
screen was "invariably huge" and had projected on it a "combination
of color and animation" that "dominated the view from public places
including nearby residences and adjacent highways,"'' 46 the Court nev-
ertheless found that the drive-in movie screen was not obtrusive
enough to justify the protection of the privacy interests of people on
the streets. 47
Not all types of protected, offensive, non-commercial speech re-
ceive identical degrees of protection. Some types of speech may be
137. Id. at 23-26.
138. See id. at 25-26. As the Court observed in a famous passage:
Surely the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is
grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us. Yet no readily
ascertainable general principle exists for stopping short of that result were
we to affirm the judgment below. For, while the particular four-letter word
being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre,
it is nevertheless often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric.
Id. at 25.
139. See id. at 16.
140. See id at 21.
141. Id-
142. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
143. See id. at 206-07, 217.
144. Id. at 209.
145. See id at 212. According to the Court, restrictions will only be upheld when
the speech invades the offended person's home, or "the degree of captivity makes it
impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure." Id. at 209. The
burden is on the viewers to avert their eyes if they find the message offensive. See id.
at 210-11.
146. Id. at 221 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
147. See id. at 212.
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restricted in such a way as to ensure distribution only to adults.1 48 For
example, in Ginsberg v. New York, 14 9 the Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction of a luncheonette owner who sold two "girlie" magazines
to a sixteen-year-old.15 ° Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, held
that material not obscene to adults may be obscene to children;''
nonetheless, only a bar on the distribution to children was permitted,
rather than a wholesale ban on the product or its display. 15 2 Similarly,
in Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC,'5 3 the Court struck down a fed-
eral law that criminalized the creation of "any obscene or indecent
communication for commercial purposes."'x5 4 The Court rejected the
government's argument that its interest in protecting children from
hearing prerecorded porn messages justified the complete suppression
of the speech.'55 The Court reasoned that a total prohibition went
much too far, because the denial of adult access far exceeded that
which was necessary to limit similar access by minors.156
Last year, in Reno v. ACLU, 1"7 the Court held that government ac-
tions regulating speech in order to avoid potential harm to children
are valid only if the regulations are narrowly drawn and if adults can
still gain access to the speech. 158 The Court found that speech cannot
be restricted solely because of indecency, as "[r]egardless of the
strength of the government's interest in protecting children, the level
of discourse ... simply cannot be limited to that which would be suita-
ble for a sandbox."' 59 Further, in Erznoznik, the Court rejected the
148. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2346 (1997) (finding that although the
government has a legitimate interest in protecting children, the Communications De-
cency Act contained unconstitutionally overbroad restrictions).
149. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
150. Id. at 631.
151. See id. at 636-37.
152. See id. at 636-39.
153. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
154. Id. at 123 n.4. In the majority opinion, Justice White held that although a
"flat-out ban of indecent speech is contrary to the First Amendment," Id. at 119
(quoting Sable Communication of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 692 F. Supp. 1208, 1209 (C.D.
Cal. 1988)), a complete ban on obscene dial-a-porn recordings is constitutional. See id.
at 124. On the other hand, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens observed that
criminal penalties for even obscene commercial communications violated the First
Amendment. See id. at 133 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
155. See id. at 131.
156. See id.; cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (allowing the FCC to
restrict the words "fuck" and "cunt," but only during certain times of the day). Even
Pacifica, however, admonishes that "the fact that society may find speech offensive is
not a sufficient reason for suppressing it." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 745.
157. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
158. See id. at 2346.
159. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1983)). As the Court observed, the government's interest
in protecting children "does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech
addressed to adults.... [T]he Government may not 'reduce the adult population...
to ... only what is fit for children."' Id. at 2346 (quoting Sable Communications, 492
U.S. at 128) (footnote omitted); accord Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383-84
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state's argument that the ban on nudity in drive-in movies was a valid
means of protecting children."6 The Court held that "[s]peech that is
neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate pro-
scription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas
or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them."""
Although children's rights are not "co-extensive with those of
adults,"' 6 the Court reasoned, "[ifn most circumstances, the values
protected by the First Amendment are no less applicable when [the]
government seeks to control the flow of information to minors."163
Reading these cases together, it is clear that a regulation completely
censuring non-commercial, non-obscene speech, ostensibly because
such speech is harmful to children, is unconstitutional. The regulation
must be narrowly tailored to prevent children from receiving the
speech, without interfering with an adult's right to access the material.
B. The Commercial Speech Doctrine
The Court's method of analyzing regulations banning or restricting
commercial speech has gone through several changes over the past
fifty years. In 1942, the Supreme Court decided Valentine v. Chresten-
sen, 4 in which the Court distinguished commercial speech from non-
commercial speech for the first time.'65 Valentine gave commercial
speech no constitutional protection at all.16 Over the years, however,
protection for commercial speech has gradually increased, and the
Court now stands on the brink of abolishing the distinction between
commercial and non-commercial speech altogether. 167
The facts of Valentine are as follows: Chrestensen, an entrepreneur
who wanted to exhibit an old United States Navy submarine off a pier
in New York City, advertised his plan by distributing handbills along
the city streets."6 The Police Commissioner warned Chrestensen that
(1957) (holding that a complete ban on sales to adults of books deemed harmful to
children is unconstitutional).
160. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1975).
161. Id.
162. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
163. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 214 (footnote omitted).
164. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
165. See Michael W. Field, Note and Comment, On Tap, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island: Last Call for the Commercial Speed Doctrine, 2 Roger Williams U. L
Rev. 57, 63 (1996).
166. See id.
167. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
591 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The test adopted by the Court thus elevates
the protection accorded commercial speech that falls within the scope of the First
Amendment to a level that is virtually indistinguishable from that of noncommercial
speech."); Field, supra note 165, at 90 ("With 44 Liqiuorinart... the Court ... signals
the end of Central Hudson's dominance over cases involving truthful, nonmisleading
commercial speech related to a lawful activity.").
168. See Valentine, 316 U.S. at 53.
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he was violating the sanitary code, which prohibited the distribution of
business advertising matter.169  The Commissioner informed
Chrestensen, however, that he could "freely distribute handbills solely
devoted to 'information or a public protest. ' "1 7  In response,
Chrestensen printed a double-faced handbill with his advertisement1
7
'
on one side and a protest of the City Dock Department on the
other. 72 The Supreme Court, citing no support,173 unanimously held
that the Constitution does not prevent the government from regulat-
ing "purely commercial advertising.' 1 74 The Court found that even
when a handbill contains both commercial and non-commercial
messages, it should not be given constitutional protection when the
"affixing of the protest against official conduct to the advertising cir-
cular [is] with the intent, and for the purpose, of evading the prohibi-
tion of the ordinance.' 75  The Court concluded that the First
Amendment did not protect Chrestensen's conduct.1 76
Thirty-four years later, the Court began to give commercial speech
some constitutional protection. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,'77 a consumer group
brought an action challenging a Virginia law that prohibited pharma-
cists from advertising the price of prescription drugs.178 On appeal,
the state argued that the profession would fall into disrepute if phar-
macists were permitted to act like "mere retailer[s]."'1 79 Further, the
state contended that the valuable pharmacist-customer relationship
would be destroyed if consumers went to lower-priced pharmacies, in-
stead of their regular pharmacists, as a result of price advertising by
pharmacists. 180 The Court, however, was unpersuaded by the state's
argument and concluded that the statute was unconstitutional.' 8 ' In
169. The code read in part: "Handbills, cards and circulars.-No person shall
throw, cast or distribute, or cause or permit to be thrown, cast or distributed, any
handbill, circular, card, booklet, placard or other advertising matter whatsoever in or
upon any street or public place." Id. at 53 n.1.
170. Id. at 53.
171. The commercial side of the handbill consisted of a revision of Chrestensen's
earlier advertisement with the admission fee removed. See id.
172. The non-commercial side of the handbill contained a protest of the City Dock
Department's refusal to grant Chrestensen wharfage facilities at a city pier. See id.
173. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 2, at 627 ("In 1942, the Supreme Court
plucked the commercial speech doctrine out of thin air.").
174. Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54.
175. Id. at 55.
176. See id.
177. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
178. The portion in dispute provided that a pharmacist licensed in Virginia acts
unprofessionally if he or she "publishes, advertises or promotes, directly or indirectly,
in any manner whatsoever, any amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or
credit terms for professional services or for drugs containing narcotics or for any
drugs which may be dispensed only by prescription." Id. at 750 n.2.
179. Id. at 768.
180. See id. at 769.
181. See id. at 770.
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so doing, the Court rejected Valentine and the "highly paternalistic"
view that the government may completely suppress commercial
speech."8 The Court recognized society's strong interest in the free
flow of commercial speech to facilitate intelligent consumer deci-
sions.' 83 The Court refused to draw a distinction between "publicly
'interesting' or 'important' commercial advertising and the opposite
kind,"'" stating that "[a]dvertising, however tasteless and excessive it
sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as
to who is producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at
what price."' 85 When faced with a choice between suppressing the
message or adopting alternative measures, the Court found that "[ilt is
precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing in-
formation, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that
the First Amendment makes for us."'18 6
Although Virginia Pharmacy offered some constitutional protection
for commercial speech, this protection was not absolute."' 7 The Court
tried drawing on the distinctions between commercial speech and non-
commercial speech to justify the lesser degree of protection granted to
commercial speech."m In defining commercial speech, the Court
stated in a footnote that there are "commonsense differences between
speech that does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction,'
and other varieties."18 9 The Court further observed that commercial
speech is more verifiable, 190 more durable,19' and has greater objectiv-
ity and hardiness than non-commercial speech."9 Justice Rehnquist,
the sole dissenter, strongly supported these observations, suggesting
182. I&
183. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763 (noting that "[als to the particular con-
sumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information, that interest may be as
keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate");
see also Field, supra note 165, at 66 ("The Court recognized society's strong interest in
receiving commercial information in order to make intelligent and well-informed de-
cisions." (footnote omitted)).
184. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765.
185. Id.
186. Id at 770.
187. Untruthful speech, deceptive or misleading speech, and speech proposing an
illegal transaction are all unprotected. See id. at 771-72. Also, the state is not prohib-
ited from "insuring that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as
freely." Id at 772 (citation omitted).
188. See id. at 771-72 n.24.
189. Id at 771 n.24 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413
U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
190. See id. at 772 n.24. But see Kozinski & Banner, supra note 2, at 637-38 (arguing
that commercial speech is not more durable than non-commercial speech).
191. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
192. See id. But see 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502 (1996)
("Regulations that suppress the truth are no less troubling because they target objec-
tively verifiable information.. . neither the 'greater objectivity' nor the 'greater hardi-
ness' of truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech justifies reviewing its complete
suppression with added deference." (citation omitted)).
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that the First Amendment was designed to protect discussion of
"political, social, and other public issues, rather than the decision of a
particular individual as to whether to purchase one or another kind of
shampoo.
193
After Virginia Pharmacy, both the definition of commercial speech
and the constitutional protection it received remained in dispute. 194
In 1980, the Supreme Court sought to remedy this problem in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.'95 Cen-
tral Hudson challenged a New York regulation that completely pro-
hibited the utility's right to advertise. 196 The Court rejected New
York's argument that because the utility owned a monopoly from the
state, the utility's advertisements could be more highly regulated. 97
The Court again recognized the "commonsense" distinction between
commercial speech and non-commercial speech,198 and without much
elaboration stated that "[t]he Constitution therefore accords a lesser
protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guar-
anteed expression.' 19 According to the Court, this "lesser protec-
tion" came in the form of a four-part analysis to determine if the
commercial speech may be restricted: first, the speech must concern
lawful activity and be non-misleading; second, the asserted govern-
mental interest must be substantial; third, the regulation must directly
advance the asserted governmental interest; and finally, the restriction
must not be more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. °°
Although the Court recognized that the regulation directly advanced
193. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 787 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
194. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 2, at 629-30.
195. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
196. See id. at 558-61. The Public Service Commission ordered all electric utilities
in New York to cease any advertising that promoted the use of electricity. See id. at
558.
197. See id. at 566-68.
198. Id. at 562 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-46
(1978)).
199. Id. at 563. Later in the opinion the Court stated in a footnote that "[t]wo
features of commercial speech permit regulation of its content. First, commercial
speakers have extensive knowledge of both the market and their products .... In
addition, commercial speech, the offspring of economic self-interest, is a hardy breed
of expression that is not 'particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regu-
lation."' Id. at 564 n.6 (quoting Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977)).
Similarly, in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), the Court made
the following observation:
To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncom-
mercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the
force of the Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of
speech. Rather than subject the First Amendment to such a devitalization,
we instead have afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protec-
tion, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First
Amendment values.
Id. at 456. But see Board of Trustees of the State Univ. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989)
("Some of our most valued forms of fully protected speech are uttered for a profit.").
200. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
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New York's legitimate interest in preventing higher energy consump-
tion,2"' it found that the regulation was more extensive than necessary
to withstand constitutional scrutiny. 2
In later cases, the Supreme Court backed away from the enhanced
protection afforded to commercial speech set fourth in Central Hud-
son. For example, in Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism
Co.,20 3 a partnership, franchised to operate a casino, challenged Pu-
erto Rico's Games of Chance Act of 1948.21 The Act made it illegal
for casinos to advertise to the local residents of Puerto Rico, but per-
mitted such advertisements aimed at nonresidents.2 5 The Court, ap-
plying Central Hudson's four-part test, found the statute
constitutional.2 6 Because the legislature had the power to ban gam-
bling, the Court reasoned that the legislature a fortiori had the power
to control the casino's advertising.20 7
201. See id. at 569-71.
202. See id. at 570. The Court determined that because the order applies to all
promotional advertising, regardless of the impact of the touted service on overall en-
ergy use, and because the Commission did not show that a more limited restriction on
the content of the advertisements would not be adequate, the order was too broad to
be upheld. See id. Justice Blackmun, in a concurrence, argued for limited permissible
restraints on commercial speech. See id. at 575 (Blackmun, I., concurring) ("If the
First Amendment guarantee means anything, it means that, absent clear and present
danger, government has no power to restrict expression because of the effects its
message is likely to have on the public. Our cases indicate that this guarantee applies
even to commercial speech." (citations omitted)). Justice Stevens made a similar ar-
gument. See id at 580 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[S]peech proposing a commercial
transaction' . ... should not include the entire range of communication that is em-
braced within the term 'promotional advertising." (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S.
at 562)).
203. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
204. See id at 333.
205. See id at 332-33.
206. See id. at 344. The asserted interest of the legislature in enacting this statute
was to curb the harm associated with gambling. See id. The Court afforded great
deference to the legislature to decide what measures it deemed fit to impose on the
casinos to satisfy this interest. See id. at 344 (holding that "it is up to the legislature to
decide whether or not such a 'counterspeech' policy would be as effective in reducing
the demand for casino gambling as a restriction on advertising"). The Court con-
cluded that the restrictions "directly advanced" the government's interest in decreas-
ing the demand for gambling; it found reinforcement for this finding in the fact that
"appellant has chosen to litigate this case all the way to this Court indicates that ap-
pellant shares the legislature's view." Id. at 342 (citation omitted).
207. See id at 345-46. As the Court explained:
In our view, the greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessar-
ily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling.... [It
would] be a strange constitutional doctrine which would concede to the leg-
islature the authority to totally ban a product or activity, but deny to the
legislature the authority to forbid the stimulation of demand for the product
or activity through advertising ....
Id. Justice Brennan, in dissent, responded to this assertion by observing that -the
'constitutional doctrine' which bans Puerto Rico from banning advertisements con-
cerning lawful casino gambling is not so strange a restraint-it is called the First
Amendment." Id. at 355 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Nine years later, in the 1995 case Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,"08
the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether Congress could
prohibit beer labels °9 from displaying the beer's alcohol content.
21 0
The Court applied the stringent scrutiny211 of the Central Hudson test
and struck down the statute. 12 The Court found that although the
federal government's asserted interest in preventing "strength
wars"2 13 was sufficiently substantial to meet the second prong of the
Central Hudson test,2 14 the government failed to meet its heavy bur-
den 215 of showing that the regulation advanced the government's in-
terest "in a direct and material fashion. 21 6 In a concurring opinion,
Justice Stevens suggested that this was not a "commercial speech"
case because speech should only be deemed to fall within the ambit of
the commercial speech doctrine when it relates to the reasons for af-
fording commercial speech less constitutional protection, "namely,
commercial speech's potential to mislead. 2 17
Today, the Court continues to apply the Central Hudson test to
commercial speech cases; however, the test has become much stricter.
208. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
209. The District Court upheld the ban as applied to advertising, but struck it down
as to labels. See id. at 479. The defendant, Coors Brewing Company, did not appeal
the decision regarding the ban on disclosing the alcohol content in advertising. See id.
210. Section 205(e)(2) of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act prohibited labels
on beer to state the percentage of alcohol in the beer, unless the state in which the
beer was to be distributed specifically required it. See Rubin, 514 U.S. at 480-81.
211. See id. at 491 (suggesting that only the least restrictive means available would
be constitutional).
212. See id.
213. Id. at 479 ("The Government took the position that... without the regulation,
[brewers] would seek to compete in the marketplace based on the potency of their
beer.").
214. See id. at 485.
215. See id. at 490 (observing that the government's burden "is not satisfied by
mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a re-
striction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real
and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree" (quoting Eden-
field v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993))).
216. Id. at 491. The Court took into consideration the fact that under the regula-
tion, advertisements were prohibited from disclosing alcohol content only if a state
affirmatively prohibited such advertisements within its jurisdiction. See id. at 488.
Also, as the Court observed, "manufacturers still can distinguish a class of stronger
malt beverages by identifying them as malt liquors." Id. at 489. Finally, in the case of
wines and spirits, alcohol content may be, and sometimes must be, disclosed on the
label. See id. at 488.
217. Id. at 494 (Stevens, J., concurring). According to Justice Stevens, the statute
neither prevent[ed] misleading speech nor protect[ed] consumers from the
dangers of incomplete information. A truthful statement about the alcohol
content of malt beverages would receive full First Amendment protection in
any other context; without some justification tailored to the special character
of commercial speech, the Government should not be able to suppress the
same truthful speech merely because it happens to appear on the label of a
product for sale.
Id. at 492 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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For example, in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,218 a divided
court219 struck down two Rhode Island statutes prohibiting the adver-
tisement of liquor prices." A liquor store had placed the word
"WOW" alongside pictures of liquor bottles in a newspaper advertise-
ment.2  The Rhode Island Liquor Control Administrator concluded
that the implied reference to discount prices for liquor violated the
statutory ban on displaying liquor prices and fined the liquor store
$400.22 Justice Stevens wrote the principal opinion for 44 Li-
quormart, advocating the application of a higher standard of scrutiny
for regulations aimed at commercial speech. - ' Quoting Virginia
Pharmacy, Justice Stevens stated that advertising, "however tasteless
and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of
information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what
reason, and at what price." 4 He concluded that states retain "less
regulatory authority when its commercial speech restrictions strike at
'the substance of the information communicated' rather than the
'commercial aspect of [it]-with offerors communicating offers to
offerees.' "225
Justices Ginsberg and Kennedy joined Justice Stevens in finding
that states have the authority to regulate commercial speech when
their purpose is "to protect consumers from misleading, deceptive, or
218. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
219. The Justices signed the opinion as follows: Justice Stevens announced the
judgment of the Court, and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to parts I,
II, and VII, in which Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg joined,
the opinion of the Court with respect to part VIII, in which Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter, and Ginsburg joined, an opinion with respect to parts III and V, in which
Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg joined, an opinion with respect to part VI, in
which Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg joined, and an opinion with respect to
part IV, in which Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg joined. Justices Scalia and Thomas
filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the judgement. Justice O'Connor
filed an opinion concurring it the judgement, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Souter and Breyer joined. See id. at 487-88.
220. See id. at 516.
221. See id. at 492-93. The advertisements did not state the actual price of the li-
quor, but they did note that "[s]tate law prohibits advertising liquor prices." Id. at 492.
222. See id. at 492-93.
223. See id. at 507-08 (opinion of Stevens, J.). Justices O'Connor, Souter, Breyer,
and Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, proposed to resolve the case more narrowly by
applying the established Central Hudson test. See id. at 528 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
224. l at 496 (opinion of Stevens, J.). Also, when evaluating the effectiveness of
the regulation in advancing the state's interest, Justice Stevens stated that it must do
so "to a material degree," which appears to be a higher standard than the Central
Hudson "reasonable fit" standard. Id. at 505 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (citation omit-
ted). Justice Stevens, however, continued to recognize the state's right to regulate
speech that is deceptive or has potential to exert an undue influence over the consum-
ers. See id. at 498 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
225. Id. at 499 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (quoting Linmark Assocs. v. Township of
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96 (1977); Carey v. Population Sen'. Int'l. 431 U.S. 678, 701
n.28 (1977)).
1998]
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aggressive sales practices. 2 2 6 The Justices reasoned, however, that
when a state bans truthful, nonmisleading speech for reason unrelated
to maintaining a fair bargaining process, little reason exists to depart
from the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally
demands.227
Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Sou-
ter in concluding that Central Hudson's "special care" review standard
should apply, "mindful that speech prohibitions of this type rarely sur-
vive constitutional review. ' 228 Justice Stevens observed that the state
bears the burden of showing that the ban's effectiveness must not only
advance the state's interest, but that it must "do so to a material de-
gree. ' 229 The price advertising ban, Justice Stevens concluded, did not
survive this inquiry.230
In part VI of the 44 Liquormart opinion, Justices Stevens, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Ginsburg rejected the state's contention that, like the
ban on casino advertising in Posadas, the statutes were an appropriate
exercise of "legislative judgment. ' 23 1 The state had argued that be-
cause the Twenty-first Amendment 232 allows states to ban alcohol,
states may therefore prohibit alcohol prices in advertisements. 233 Jus-
tice Stevens held that "on reflection, we are now persuaded that
Posadas erroneously performed the First Amendment analysis. 234
The Court flatly rejected the notion that the power given to the states
226. Id. at 501 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
227. See id. (opinion of Stevens, J.).
228. Id. at 504 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
229. Id. at 505 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771
(1993)). The Court also noted that "a commercial speech regulation 'may not be sus-
tained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government's pur-
pose."' Id. (opinion of Stevens, J.) (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980)).
230. See id. at 508 (opinion of Stevens, J.) ("It necessarily follows that the price
advertising ban cannot survive the more stringent constitutional review that Central
Hudson itself concluded was appropriate for the complete suppression of truthful,
nonmisleading commercial speech." (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9)).
231. Id. (opinion of Stevens, J.).
232. Section two of the Twenty-first Amendment states: "The transportation or
importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery
or use therein of intoxicating liquors in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohib-
ited." U.S. Const. amend. XXI, § 2.
233. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 508 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
234. Id. at 509 (opinion of Stevens, J.). Justice Stevens, citing the long history of
commercial speech regulation of this type, found that Posadas gave too much defer-
ence to the legislature. See id. at 509-10 (opinion of Stevens, J.). Justice Stevens also
rejected the "greater-includes-the-lesser" argument, because he felt that such an argu-
ment was not only "inconsistent with both logic and well-settled doctrine," but there
was no reason to assume that the "[s]tate's power to regulate commercial activity is
'greater' than its power to ban truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech." Id. at 511
(opinion of Stevens, J.). Justice Stevens found that "[elven though government is
under no obligation to provide a person, or the public, a particular benefit, it does not
follow that conferral of the benefit may be conditioned on the surrender of a constitu-
tional right." Id. at 513 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (citation omitted).
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through the Twenty-first Amendment to regulate intoxicating liquor
qualifies the constitutional prohibition against laws abridging the free-
dom of speech embodied in the First Amendment."
The "special care" review applied by the Supreme Court in 44 Li-
quormart, coupled with the increased burden on the government to
show the ban's effectiveness "to a material degree," signaled the end
of the commercial speech doctrine as it had evolved over the last fifty
years 36 What will replace it, however, has yet to be determined. 37
In any event, as discussed below in part III, the doctrine still plays a
dominating role in the area of trademarks.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT AND TRADEMARKS CASES
When analyzing regulations censoring trademarks, courts have clas-
sified the regulated speech as "commercial," even when the speech
being regulated is not related to any underlying business transaction.
This part looks at several examples of these cases. This part also ex-
amines the justifications for placing trademarks within the realm of
commercial speech.
A. Cases Applying the Commercial Speech Doctrine to Trademarks
In Sambo's of Ohio, Inc. v. City Council of Toledo," 8 a restaurant
corporation challenged the Toledo Planning Commission's ("Commis-
sion") grant of a construction permit to the corporation on the condi-
tion that the restaurant would not use its trade name "Sambo's."3 9
The Commission, as well as the NAACP, had objected to the restau-
rant's use of the name "Sambo's" because it found the name to be
offensive?40 The court found that although the "Sambo's" sign consti-
235. See id at 516.
236. See i at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring) (signaling the end of the Central Hudson
test by stating that he shared "Justice Thomas's discomfort with the Central Hudson
test, which seems to me to have nothing more than policy intuition to support it"); see
also Kozinski & Banner, supra note 2, at 631 (arguing that the commercial speech
doctrine is in such disarray that "[ulnless a case has facts very much like those of a
prior case, it is nearly impossible to predict the winner").
237. See Field, supra note 165, at 89 ("After reviewing the two commercial speech
components, the Court will realize their rationale is no longer valid. The only remain-
ing question is what will be the parameters of the new commercial speech doctrine.").
238. 466 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
239. See id at 179. The name "Sambo's" is registered with the Patent and Trade-
mark Office under 15 U.S.C. § 1051. See id.
240. See id. at 179-80. The first Sambo's restaurant was opened in 1957 by Sam
Battistone and F. Newell Bohnett. Battistone's son suggested the name for the pan-
cake house because "Sambo's" not only conjured up associations with pancakes, but it
also combined the names of the founders:
The pancake image derives from The Story of Little Black Sambo written in
1899 by Helen Bannerman. A childhood narrative, it is the tale of a small
boy, Little Black Sambo, who loses his red coat, blue trousers, purple shoes
and green umbrella to marauding tigers. In fighting among themselves, the
tigers chase each other in a ring around a tree, running so fast that they melt
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tuted commercial advertising, thereby entitling it to less protection,
the Commission's action was nonetheless an unconstitutional depriva-
tion of the corporation's First Amendment right to free speech.241
Further, the court concluded that no considerable government interest
existed to justify the ban.242 In response to the Commission's argu-
ment that the city had a strong interest in banning the sign because a
portion of the population might find the name offensive, the court
found that "if [the sign] is too offensive to too many people, its use
will be counterproductive, for those who are offended will not only
refuse to buy the product, but also, if they are sufficiently offended,
they will attempt to persuade others to refuse also. '2 43 The court
proved to be quite prophetic, for soon after its ruling, Sambo's Res-
taurants, Inc. filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter
Eleven of the Bankruptcy Code.2 44
The Sambo's trademark came under attack again in Sambo's Res-
taurants, Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor.245 Sambo's had signed an agree-
ment with the town of Ann Arbor assuring the town that it would not
use the name "Sambo's" in conjunction with its restaurant, in ex-
change for the town's promise to grant the necessary building per-
mits. 24 6 Sambo's, however, used the name anyway,2 47 claiming g that
its use of the name, although perhaps offensive, was protected speech
away leaving nothing but a big pool of butter. Little Black Sambo and his
parents then use the butter in preparing a delicious pancake supper.
Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 687 n.1 (6th Cir. 1981).
But see id. at 702 (Keith, J., dissenting) (finding the term "Sambo's" to be "derogatory
in any context").
241. See Sambo's of Ohio, 466 F. Supp. at 179. The court distinguished the
"Sambo's" sign from types of speech that may be regulated, including fighting words,
obscenity, fraudulent or deceptive statements, speech to captive audiences, infringe-
ments on the privacy rights of others and matters relating to juveniles. See id.
242. See id. ("It is clear that the circumstances of the present case do not bring it
within those exceptions to the First Amendment guarantees ...."). The court held
that no matter how distasteful and offensive the commercial language is, the First
Amendment forbids the government from censoring it. See id. at 180 ("It would be
selling our birthright for a mess of pottage to hold that because language is offensive
and distasteful even to a majority of the public, a legislative body may forbid its
use.").
243. Id. at 180. As the court observed, if people are "offended by the word
'Sambo's' not only can they refuse to patronize the plaintiffs, but they, too, can erect
signs, carry placards, or publish advertisements designed to persuade others to refuse
to patronize the plaintiffs. That is what freedom of speech is all about." Id. The court
also disapproved of the silencing tactic used by the Commission, comparing Voltaire's
declaration "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to
say it" with the Commission's apparent paraphrasing of it: "We disapprove of what
you say, and will destroy or banish or gag you if you say it." Id.
244. See Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. v. Wheeler (In re Sambo's Restaurants, Inc.),
754 F.2d 811, 812 (9th Cir. 1985).
245. 663 F.2d 686 (6th Cir. 1981).
246. See id. at 687.
247. When the restaurant began to lose money, Sambo's applied for, and received,
permits to use the name "Sambo's" on its signs; however, the permits were subse-
quently revoked. See id. at 687-88.
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under the First Amendment.2" A panel of the Sixth Circuit found the
speech in question raised the issue of "'offensive' commercial
speech" 24 9 and thus applied the Central Hudson standard2a° for deter-
mining the constitutionality of restrictions on commercial speech. 5 1
The court held that the town's revocation of the sign permit "clearly
infringes on [Sambo's] First Amendment rights.'1 2 2 Turning next to
the speech itself, the court noted that although "much commercial
speech may be 'tasteless and excessive,' [these] characteristics alone
could not justify repression of the speech."" 3 Further, the court
found that, in non-obscenity cases, the mere fact that protected speech
can be offensive does not mean that it can be suppressed,5 The court
held that the city must show "[m]uch more than a speculative casual
[sic] relationship" between the city's interest behind the speech regu-
lation and the regulation itself.5 5 Concluding that the city failed to do
so, the court enjoined the city from denying Sambo's sign permits.2 6
Another example of a court pigeonholing trademarks into the cate-
gory of commercial speech is Hornell Brewing Co. v. Brady. '  In
Hornell, the court considered the constitutionality of a statute that
forbade labels on alcohol bottles from containing any reference to the
name "Crazy Horse."' 8s The statute also provided for the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms to immediately revoke any certificate
of label approval already issued for labels which bore that name." 9
Hornell-the maker of "The Original Crazy Horse Malt Liquor"-
and its authorized bottler, G. Heileman Brewing Company, moved for
an injunction to prevent enforcement of the statute.2 °
The court held that the "Crazy Horse Malt Liquor" label was un-
questionably commercial speech,261 even though the challenged regu-
lation was not designed to prevent a commercial harm, but rather to
protect Native Americans from what Congress perceived to be an of-
fensive exploitation of the famous Sioux leader, Crazy Horse. 62 The
court scrutinized the regulation under the four-part Central Hudson
248. See id- at 689.
249. Id. at 687.
250. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
251. See Sambo's Restaurants, 663 F.2d at 693.
252. Id. at 690.
253. Id. at 694-95 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976)).
254. See id. at 695 (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701
(1977)).
255. Id.
256. See id.
257. 819 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
258. See id. at 1229.
259. See id. at 1231.
260. See id
261. See id. at 1233.
262. See id. at 1234.
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test applied to commercial speech,26 3 and noted that "[a]lthough com-
mercial speech may enjoy less protection than political speech, the
Supreme Court, in fact, accords it a high value unless it is false or
misleading or causes distinctive adverse effects which directly flow
from the commercial speech regulated. ' '2 1 The court concluded that
the regulation was not narrowly drawn, nor did it directly advance the
government's interest.265 Therefore, the court held, the statute was
unconstitutional.266
A recent example of a court's use of the commercial speech doc-
trine in the context of trademarks is Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. New
York State Liquor Authority.267 In Bad Frog, a beer brewery applied
to the New York State Liquor Authority ("NYSLA") for approval of
its beer label.268 The label contained a drawing of a frog with four
digits: one of the frog's middle digits was extended upwards.269 The
NYSLA rejected the label application.270 In court, the NYSLA ar-
gued that its decision to reject the label was justified by the state's
significant interests in protecting children from "profane advertis-
ing ' 271 and promoting "temperance and respect for the law. '2 72 The
263. See id. at 1233.
264. Id. at 1239 (citing Discovery Network, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 946 F.2d 464,
469-71 (6th Cir. 1991)).
265. See id. at 1240.
266. See id.
267. 134 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1998).
268. See Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 973 F. Supp. 280,
281 (N.D.N.Y. 1997). Section 107-a(4)(a) of the New York Alcoholic Beverage Con-
trol Law mandates that any alcoholic product marketed in New York must have its
brand or trade name and label approved by the NYSLA. See N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont.
Law § 107-a(4)(a) (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1998). Signs deemed by the NYSLA to
be "obscene or indecent," "obnoxious or offensive to the commonly and generally
accepted standard of fitness and good taste," or "any illustration which is not digni-
fied, modest and in good taste" may be prohibited. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit.
9, § 83.3(2)(iii)-(ix) (1995).
Bad Frog's label has been approved by the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms. See Bad Frog, 973 F. Supp. at 281. While the label is banned in New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and North Carolina, it has been approved for marketing in
twenty-two other states. See Gary Spencer, "Bad Frog" Beer Banned for "Profane"
Label, N.Y. L.J., July 31, 1997, at 1.
269. See Bad Frog, 973 F. Supp. at 281. Along with the caricature of the frog, the
label also contained slogans such as "He Just Don't Care," "Amphibian With An
Attitude," "The Beer So Good ... It's Bad," "Big Bad 40 oz .... "He's Mean, Green,
and Obscene," and "Turning Bad Into Good." See id.
270. See id. at 281-82.
271. Id. at 283.
272. Id. The NYSLA elaborated on this in their brief to the Second Circuit, stating
that:
The Authority has carefully considered the social and behavioral implica-
tions arising from the applied-for labels and the negative, provocative and
combative connotations evoked by the phrases, "HE JUST DON'T CARE"
and "ATTITUDE" in the context selected by the applicant of a graphic illus-
tration of a frog "giving the finger." The Authority, in its experience, has
observed that numerous disputes in licensed premises often spin out of con-
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court, employing the Central Hudson test, found both of these inter-
ests substantial.2 73 Further, the court found the illustration of the frog
to be commercial speech 74 and saying the equivalent of "fuck
you." 75 Because the court found a reasonable link276 between the
regulation and the state's interest in protecting children from profane
advertising, 77 the court allowed the state to ban the speech. s
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's ruling.279
At first, the court questioned whether the label was so purely com-
mercial as to lie outside the ambit of the First Amendment.2- * The
court concluded, however, that the label was entitled to the protec-
tions afforded commercial speech because the label was a form of ad-
vertising, it identified a specific product, and it served the economic
interest of the speaker." 1 Under commercial speech analysis, 2- the
court held that the ban was unconstitutional because it lacked a "rea-
trol after a gesture is made or a remark is passed which is considered to be
insulting. These incidents have resulted in physical violence, beatings, shoot-
ings and stabbings, some of which have led to homicides.
Brief for Appellees at 7-8, Bad Frog, 134 F.3d 87 (No. 97-7949). But see Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (finding that the words -fuck the draft" are not
fighting words).
273. See Bad Frog, 973 F. Supp. at 283-84.
274. See id. at 282.
275. Id at 285. The gesture of raising the middle finger to signify an insult has been
used for many centuries; it has even been said that the gesture was used by Diogenes
to insult Demosthenes. See Bad Frog, 134 F.3d at 91 n.1 (citing Betty J. Biiuml &
Franz H. Bduml, Dictionary of Worldwide Gestures 159 (2d ed. 1997)).
276. The court applied an intermediate level of scrutiny and found a "reasonable
fit," Bad Frog, 973 F. Supp. at 287, although Bad Frog "argued the state could achieve
its goal of protecting the young with something less than a complete ban on Bad Frog
beer, suggesting limits on sale locations and on billboard, print and broadcast adver-
tising." Spencer, supra note 268, at 3.
277. See Bad Frog, 973 F. Supp. at 285; cf. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968) (upholding a conviction for selling a "girlie" magazine to a 16-year-old, even
though the magazine was not "obscene"). As one commentator observed, the state's
purported interest in protecting the sensibilities of children from the Bad Frog label is
somewhat suspect, because "[a]lthough Bad Frog beer is banned in New York, the
brewery's T-shirts, hats, and other promotional items are available." Spencer, supra
note 268, at 3; cf. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 715 (1984) (observ-
ing that Oklahoma's selective regulation of liquor advertising "suggests limits on the
substantiality of the interests it asserts").
278. See Bad Frog, 973 F. Supp. at 288.
279. See Bad Frog, 134 F.3d at 102-03.
280. See id at 96 ("Since Friedman, the Supreme Court has not explicitly clarified
whether commercial speech, such as a logo or a slogan that conveys no information,
other than identifying the source of the product, but that serves, to some degree, to
'propose a commercial transaction,' enjoys any First Amendment protection.").
281. See id at 97. The court found that although "the label communicates no infor-
mation beyond the source of the product, we think that minimal information, con-
veyed in the context of a proposal of a commercial transaction, suffices to invoke the
protections for commercial speech, articulated in Central Hudson." Id. at 96-97.
282. See supra Part II.
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sonable fit" between the state's interest in shielding minors from vul-
gar speech and the complete ban of the Bad Frog label.283
In its Bad Frog decision, the Second Circuit explicitly characterized
the speech as commercial speech, despite the fact that the regulation
did not address a commercial harm.284 Although the court remained
"unpersuaded by Bad Frog's attempt to separate the purported social
commentary in the labels from the hawking of beer," '285 it was actually
the NYSLA who sought to ban speech for reasons that were unrelated
to the "hawking of beer." '86 As the NYSLA readily conceded, the
regulation was not being used to guard against commercial harms, but
rather to censor a message that the NYSLA found to contain "a sexu-
ally provocative confrontational gesture, 2 8 7 which the NYSLA be-
lieved "to be clearly irresponsible" on the brewer's part.288 Further,
the NYSLA pointed to the potential detrimental effects on a young
audience as another justification for its censorship.289
B. Justifications for Treating Trademarks as Commercial Speech
The strongest argument for the classification of trademarks as com-
mercial speech is that trademarks "propose a commercial transac-
tion."29 Most labels and advertisements bearing trademarks, as well
as the trademarks themselves, are designed to entice a customer to
283. Bad Frog, 134 F.3d at 101.
284. The NYSLA acknowledges the fact that the regulation was not aimed at
preventing commercial harm, stating that "the commercial speech at issue-a cartoon
frog 'giving the finger' with confrontational slogans-may not be characterized as
misleading or related to illegal activity .... Brief for Appellees at 24, Bad Frog (No.
97-7949).
285. Bad Frog, 134 F.3d at 97.
286. The NYSLA conceded the aim of the speech was not commercial, acknowl-
edging that the banned message "convey[ed] no useful consumer information ....
Brief for Appellees at 24 n.5, Bad Frog (No. 97-7949).
287. Id. at 7.
288. Id. at 8.
289. See id. This, however, is no justification to classify speech as commercial. As
Justice Blackmun noted in Central Hudson: "If the First Amendment guarantee
means anything, it means that, absent clear and present danger, government has no
power to restrict expression because of the effect its message is likely to have on the
public. Our cases indicate that this guarantee applies even to commercial speech."
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 575 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Thomas W. Merrill, Comment, First Amendment
Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 205, 243-251 (1976)). As the Court explained in 44 Liquormart, "a State's
paternalistic assumption that the public will use truthful, nonmisleading commercial
information unwisely cannot justify a decision to suppress it .... "44 Liquormart, Inc.
v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 497 (1996). If a trademark is being regulated for rea-
sons other than to address commercial harms, the regulation should have to pass strict
scrutiny in order to be constitutional. See infra Part IV.
290. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413
U.S. 376, 385 (1972)).
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buy a product,291 and thereby propose a commercial transaction.2 -
The Supreme Court, in Friedman v. Rogers,293 held that when a trade
name has become well-known, it conveys a message about the type,
cost, and quality of the product or service associated with the product;
"[iln each role, the trade name is used as part of a proposal of a com-
mercial transaction." 94 Under this rationale, the purpose of the
trademark or trade name is "strictly business."29 -'
Further, businesses do not normally use trademarks to express mat-
ters of social discourse, political satire, newsworthy observations, or
the like.2 96 Rather, they use trademarks to sell products, the sale of
which the government is, concededly, empowered to regulate.' Ac-
cording to this reasoning, there is little reason to allow the govern-
ment to regulate the price of products, the place of sale of products,
and in some cases, when the product can be sold, without allowing
restrictions of the trademarks themselves.298
Another justification for classifying trademarks as commercial
speech is that trademarks and trade names can easily be used to mis-
lead consumers.299 Many consumers depend upon the purveyor's
mark to decide the value and quality of a product or service. - ' Often,
this reliance is misplaced. 31  A business can lower the quality of its
products and services, or change the product or service entirely, all
291. Trademarks can either directly appeal to a consumer or persuade a consumer
to chose one product over another. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
§ 9 cmt. c (1995); see also id. Reporters' Note cmt. c ("Trade-marks, indeed, are the
essence of competition, because they make possible a choice between competing arti-
cles by enabling the buyer to distinguish one from the other." (quoting S. Rep. No. 79-
1333, at 4 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275)).
292. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993) ("Commercial speech ... is
'linked inextricably' with the commercial arrangement that it proposes." (citing Fried-
man v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 n.9 (1979))).
293. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
294. Id. at 11.
295. Id.
296. See id (finding that one who uses a trade name "does not wish to report any
particularly newsworthy fact, or to make generalized observations even about com-
mercial matters" (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976))).
297. Cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502 (1996) (holding that
"[i]t is the State's interest in protecting consumers from 'commercial harms'" whichjustifies less scrutiny for regulations restricting commercial speech (citing City of Cin-
cinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 426 (1993))).
298. The state derives its interest in regulating commercial speech from its regula-
tion of the underlying transaction. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993)
("Commercial speech ... is 'linked inextricably' with the commercial arrangement
that it proposes." (citing Friedman, 440 U.S. at 10 n.9)).
299. See Friedman, 440 U.S. at 13 (discussing some scenarios where trade names
may be used to mislead consumers).
300. See id. at 11 (finding that trade names are used to "convey information about
the type, price, and quality of services offered for sale in that practice").
301. See id. at 13 (observing that "[tihe possibilities for deception [within trade-
marks] are numerous").
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while keeping the same mark.30 2 The government is in the best posi-
tion to protect against consumer fraud.3 0 3 To allow businesses to have
unfettered discretion to use and abuse trademarks and trade names
would leave the government without arrows in its regulatory quiver
and consumers without protection from unscrupulous business
practices.30 4
While the above justifications may be appropriate for supporting
trademark regulations aimed at protecting consumers from commer-
cial harm, such as inadequate safety warnings or mislabeled ingredi-
ents. they are entirely inapplicable in supporting regulations that focus
on the non-commercial aspects of the trademark and in no way at-
tempt to remedy commercial harms. As Bad Frog and other cases
illustrate, however, courts have failed to make this significant distinc-
tion, resulting in government suppression of speech and ideas that are
entitled to full First Amendment protection. As discussed below in
part IV, courts need to carefully examine the purpose behind the chal-
lenged trademark regulation before deciding what level of scrutiny to
apply.
IV. WHY TRADEMARKS Do NOT CONSTITUTE
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Despite the benefits of categorizing trademarks as commercial
speech, the costs of such categorization to the First Amendment can
be even greater. This part examines the legal and policy justifications
for applying strict scrutiny to trademark regulations that are not
designed to protect consumers from commercial harms.
A. Legal Justifications
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court has defined commer-
cial speech as speech that does "no more than propose a commercial
transaction. ' '30 5 The properties of trademarks, however, are wide and
varied and often do more than simply propose a commercial transac-
tion. The existence of commercial elements within a trademark
302. See id. (finding the possibility of deception where "[t]he trale name ... can
remain unchanged despite changes in the staff . . . upon whose skill and care the
public depends when it patronizes the practice"); cf Genel, supra note 37, at 300
(arguing that courts should require trademark owners to maintain a consistent quality
of goods associated with their marks).
303. See generally Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496 (1995) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (discussing the evils of false commercial speech and the reasons that
government regulation of such speech is permitted).
304. Cf id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that commercial speech often oc-
curs at the place of sale; therefore, there is little time for consumers to protect them-
selves against the evils of false commercial speech through counter-speech and
considered reflection).
305. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976) (citation omitted).
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should not justify government suppression of the trademark's non-
commercial qualities.3 0 6 The Supreme Court has articulated this ra-
tionale throughout its line of commercial speech cases, restricting
states when they attempt to regulate speech for reasons unrelated to
the commercial transaction.30 7 As the Court observed in Central Hud-
son, government regulations on commercial speech are permissible
when they are designed "to protect consumers from fraudulent, mis-
leading, or coercive sales techniques." 38  Indeed, as the Court has
found, the typical justification for alloving commercial speech to be
more severely restricted than non-commercial speech is the protection
of consumers from "commercial harms. 30 9 Conversely, "when a
State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading
commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a
fair bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart from the rig-
orous review that the First Amendment generally demands."310
Trademarks can be used to express political and social statements in
many different ways.31 For example, trademarks can become so tied
306. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 350-51
(1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that regulations restricting commercial
speech that protect consumers from "deception or coercion" are not given full First
Amendment scrutiny); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980) ("[I]n recent years this Court has not approved a blanket
ban on commercial speech unless the expression itself was flawed in some way, either
because it was deceptive or related to unlawful activity.").
307. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (opinion of
Stevens, J.); see also Rubin, 514 U.S. at 494 ("As a matter of common sense, any
description of commercial speech that is intended to identify the category of speech
entitled to less Frst Amendment protection should relate to the reasons for permit-
ting broader regulation: namely, commercial speech's potential to mislead." (citations
omitted)); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 574 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Permissible
restraints on commercial speech have been limited to measures designed to protect
consumers from fraudulent, misleading, or coercive sales techniques."); Linmark As-
socs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96 (1977) (finding unconstitutional
a statute banning "For Sale" signs because the statute was not aimed at "any commer-
cial aspect of [the] signs ... ").
308. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 574 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Friedman v.
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 n.9 (1979)).
309. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 502 (opinion of Stevens, J.) ("It is the State's inter-
est in protecting consumers from 'commercial harms' that provides 'the typical reason
why commercial speech can be subject to greater governmental regulation than non-
commercial speech."' (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S.
410, 426 (1993)).
310. ld at 501. (opinion of Stevens, J.). In his concurrence in Rubin, Justice Ste-
vens stated that the "commercial speech doctrine" does not apply when the chal-
lenged regulation "neither prevents misleading speech nor protects consumers from
the dangers of incomplete information." Rubin, 514 U.S. at 491-92 (Stevens, J., con-
curring). Further, he observed that "truthful statement[s] ... [which] would receive
full First Amendment protection in any other context[, without some justification
tailored to the special character of commercial speech .... [cannot be suppressed]
merely because it happens to appear on the label of a product for sale." Id. at 492
(Stevens, J., concurring).
311. See generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericit: Trademarks as
Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 397, 397 (1990) (observing
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in with a political group or association that the trademark itself be-
comes a way of expressing the sentiments of the organization. For
example, the PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals)
mark is not used to sell a product, but merely to convey a message
about the organization's beliefs about animals.312 The trade name
COYOTE (Cast Off Your Old Tired Ethics) is used by an organization
to raise support for the legalization of prostitution,313 as NORML
(National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws) does for
marijuana314 and the NRA (National Rifle Association) does for
guns.315 The mark "MC" on a biker's jacket also sends a social state-
ment. Much like the mark "®" is used to indicate that a mark is fed-
erally registered, the Hell's Angels allows motorcycle clubs to use the
mark "MC" on their jackets to signify that they are sanctioned by the
Hell's Angels. 316
Even if a company's primary focus is to sell products and collect a
profit, it may use its trademark to express a political message as well.
For example, the Old Glory Condom Corporation intended its mark
to express its belief that the use of condoms is patriotic. 317 It accom-
plished this goal by registering as its trademark a condom decorated
with an American flag.318 Similarly, the trademark chosen by Bad
Frog Breweries, a frog extending a middle digit upwards, was intended
not only to identify the beer but to convey either "peace, solidarity,
and good will" '319 or an anti-establishment statement.320 Another cor-
poration, Both Worlds Incorporated, expressed its displeasure at the
that marks "that once functioned solely as signals denoting the source, origin, and
quality of goods, have become products in their own right, valued as indicators of the
status, preferences, and aspirations of those who use them").
312. See Christine Gorman, What's It Worth to Find A Cure?, Time, July 8, 1996, at
53, 53.
313. See Terry Glover, The Shame Game: Who Profits from Prostitution, Playboy,
June 1996, at 58, 58.
314. See The Smoke-Filled Room, Playboy, Oct. 1996, at 48, 48.
315. See Robert Scheer, Gums N' Poses, Playboy, Mar. 1994, at 45, 45.
316. See John Sullivan, For Motorcycle Gang Without Motorcycles, Even More Bad
News, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1998, at B4.
317. See In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216 (1993). The
corporation was formed after its president participated in an exhibition entitled
"Trouble in Paradise," which focused on artists' reactions to contemporary social and
political issues. See id. at 1217. The president's exhibit was intended to focus attention
on AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases. See id. Moreover, on the back of
each condom package is the "'Old Glory Pledge': We believe it is patriotic to protect
and save lives. We offer only the highest quality condoms. Join us in promoting safer
sex. Help eliminate AIDS. A portion of Old Glory profits will be donated to AIDS
related services." Id.
318. See id.
319. Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 91 (2d
Cir. 1998) (noting that in a petition, Bad Frog claimed that "the company's goal was
to claim the gesture as its own and as a symbol of peace, solidarity, and good will").
320. See Brief for Appellees at 8, Bad Frog (No. 97-7949) (stating the label "in-
vite[s] the public not to heed conventional wisdom and to disobey standards of deco-
rum"). The New York State Liquor Authority elaborated:
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amount of people wearing polo shirts with prestigious emblems on
them by using as a mark for its own polo shirts the silhouette of a
defecating dog.321
Another way that trademarks can be used to convey a political or
social statement is when consumers themselves begin to adopt an un-
intended meaning of the mark. Similar to the way Americans in Bos-
ton in the late 1700s would order coffee in public (not because they
were thirsty, but rather to convey a message that they supported sepa-
ration from England (the English drank tea)), 32' many trademarks are
worn or displayed by the public to send messages.3- In 1978, for ex-
ample, a not-for-profit group 32 4 named S.T.O.P. 31 protested a plan to
build a medium-security prison for young offenders in Olympic Vil-
lage near Lake Placid, New York, by designing, printing, and distribut-
ing posters bearing the word "Olympic" along with the Olympic
rings.3 2 1 The building was going to be used as temporary housing for
Olympic athletes,327 after which it was to be converted into the
The Authority has carefully considered the social and behavioral implica-
tions arising from the applied-for labels and the negative, provocative and
combative connotations evoked by the phrases, "HE JUST DON'T CARE"
and "ATTITUDE" in the context selected by the applicant of a graphic illus-
tration of a frog "giving the finger."
Id. at 7.
321. See Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1635, 1638
(1988).
322. See Benjamin Woods Labaree, The Boston Tea Party 7 (1964); see also John F.
Mariani, The Dictionary of American Food & Drink 118 (1983) (noting that coffee
sales during the Revolutionary War increased 600%, due in part to a protest against
the high taxes on tea imposed by the British).
323. See Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of
the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L Rev. 158,
202 (observing that a trademark "provides a vehicle for the communication of ideas").
For example, like members of motorcycle gangs in the past, recent day street gang
members have adopted the "Raiders" emblem as a sign of membership in a gang. See
Roberta Johnson Schneider, Detective Gives Parents Some Clues About Gangs, Kan.
City Star, Jan. 25,1997, at 10; Nina Siegal, Ganging Up on Civil Liberties, Progressive,
Oct. 1997, at 28, 28-29.
324. See Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp.
1112, 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
325. S.T.O.P. stands for "Stop The Olympic Prison." Id. at 1114. S.T.O.P. was
an association of religious, civil, and criminal justice reform groups created
in 1978 for the purposes of organizing opposition to and increasing public
knowledge about the construction of a federal prison for youthful offenders
in Raybrook [sic], New York, and the use of that prison to house athletes
gathered to participate in the 1980 Winter Olympic Games in Lake Placid,
New York.
Id. at 1116.
326. See id at 1114-15. The words "STOP THE OLYMPIC PRISON" appeared on
the top half of the poster. Id. at 1127. Underneath the title was a picture of a hand
holding the Olympic torch jutting out from behind prison bars. See id. Wrapped
around the wrist were the five intertining circles indicative of the Olympic rings. See
id
327. See id at 1115.
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prison.3" S.T.O.P. used the posters to inextricably link the decision to
build the prison with the United States Olympic Committee. 9 When
the Committee brought suit against S.T.O.P., the court concluded that
S.T.O.P.'s use of the Olympic trademarks was a valid form of speech
expression.33 °
People may also use trademarks to express opinions about the
mark's owners by using the marks in a parody.331 For example, in a
parody of the L.L. Bean catalog, High Society magazine 332 published
an article bearing the L.L. Bean trademark and featuring nude models
in sexually explicit positions.333 After winning a summary judgement
motion, L.L. Bean obtained an injunction prohibiting High Society
magazine from further publication of the article.334 The First Circuit
reversed, finding that an injunction would allow a corporation to
"shield itself from criticism by forbidding the use of its name in com-
mentaries critical of its conduct. 335
In addition, an expression of art is often embedded within a trade-
mark.336 The concept of a trademark's design is similar to the concept
328. See id. Congress had authorized $49 million in federal funds for the construc-
tion of the facility on the condition that it be put to permanent use after the Olympics.
See id.
329. See id. at 1124.
330. See id. at 1121-25.
331. The First Circuit Court has held that:
The central role which trademarks occupy in public discourse ...makes
them a natural target of parodists. Trademark parodies, even when offen-
sive, do convey a message. The Message may be simply that business and
product images need not always be taken too seriously; a trademark parody
reminds us that we are free to laugh at the images and associations linked
with the mark. The message also may be a simple form of entertainment
conveyed by juxtaposing the irreverent representation of the trademark with
the idealized image created by the mark's owner. While such a message
lacks explicit political content, that is no reason to afford it less protection
under the first amendment. Denying parodists the opportunity to poke fun
at symbols and names which have become woven into the fabric of our daily
life, would constitute a serious curtailment of a protected form of expression.
L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1987) (citations
omitted).
332. High Society magazine is an "adult erotic entertainment" magazine published
monthly. Id. at 27.
333. See id. The article also stated the contents on the page were "humor" and a
"parody." Id.
334. See id.
335. Id. at 33. The court found that "[t]he Constitution does not ... permit the
range of the anti-dilution statute to encompass the unauthorized use of a trademark in
a noncommercial setting such as an editorial or artistic context." Id.
336. See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203,
205 (1942) ("The protection of trademarks is the law's recognition of the psychologi-
cal function of symbols.... The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by
making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing
power of a congenial symbol."); McCarthy, supra note 32, § 7.06; cf. Tara J. Gold-
smith, Note, What's Wrong with this Picture? When the Lanham Act Clashes with
Artistic Expression, 7 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 821, 824-25 (1997)
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of recognized pieces of artwork; they are both designed to convey
messages, emotions, and to reach people visually.337 Some trade-
marks are even recognized pieces of artwork, such as the nude draw-
ing on the label of a 1993 bottle of Chateau Mouton Rothschild by the
modem artist Balthus.338 Additionally, other trademarks may become
works of art, such as Andy Warhol's Campbell Soup can paintings. 339
Even artwork itself can become trademark protected. For example, in
Romm Art Creations Ltd. v. Simcha International Inc., 3 0 the Eastern
District of New York found that certain Govezensky limited edition
reproduction paintings of women in a caf6 infringed on similar paint-
ings by Tarkay and therefore enjoined their sale. "  Similarly, paint-
ings on greeting cards are protected by trademark law, 2 as are
drawings adorning the covers of novels. 3
Further, the manner of expressing trademarks and trade names can
constitute protected speech. The trade dress of a product consists of
the artistic and stylistic element of a trademark or trade name.? 4 For
instance, the distinctive yellow-and-black style of the Cliffs Notes is
protected as part and parcel of the trademark,345 as is the old style
lettering and borders of the Old Farmers Almanac. 6 Even the artis-
tic construction of a distinctive building, such as White Castle's old
(discussing the conflict between the First Amendment protection of artistic expression
and trademark law).
337. See Mishawaka, 316 U.S. at 208 ("The creation of a market through an estab-
lished symbol implies that people float on a psychological current engendered by the
various advertising devices which give a trade-mark its potency."). See generally
Hugh M. Hefner, Golden Dreams, Playboy, Jan. 1994, at 14, 265 (discussing the rea-
sons for choosing a rabbit as a trademark, including the fact that the rabbit "would be
both playful and sophisticated").
338. See Forum F.Y.L, Playboy, May 1997, at 53. 53. Many people found the nude
drawing offensive and "managed to browbeat the vineyard into relabeling 30,000 bot-
tles." Id-; see also infra notes 359-62 and accompanying text (arguing that a proper
response to offensive marks is to boycott and protest the use of the mark).
339. Warhol painted campbell soup cans many times. See Bennard B. Perlman, Edi-
torial, Is Warhol's Art Art Yet?, Baltimore Sun, Mar. 26, 1997, at 17A.
340. 786 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
341. See id at 1141.
342. See Hartford House Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1533, 1540 (D.
Colo. 1986) (observing that one purpose of the Lanham Act "is to protect a creative
artist's rights in his or her creation and thus provide incentive to be creative").
343. See Harlequin Enters. Ltd. v. Gulf & W. Corp., 644 F.2d 946, 949-50 (2d Cir.
1981).
344. Trade dress of a product consists of the total effect of "background" including
the shape, color, and design of the packaging, as well as the containers in which the
product is sold. McCarthy, supra note 93, § 23:18.
345. See Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d
490, 492 (2d Cir. 1989).
346. See Yankee Publ'g Inc. v. News Am. Publ'g Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267. 269-70
(S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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century castle-shaped building, is considered to be a protected
trademark.347
B. Policy Justifications
The existence of non-commercial qualities within a trademark, in
and of itself, is enough to prevent the government from enacting any
regulations of that trademark extending beyond the scope of protect-
ing consumers from "commercial harm." But the free market also
provides assurance that consumers will reject offensive trademarks
without excessive government intervention. 48
The most common usage of a trademark or trade name is to identify
products as being produced by a certain corporation.349 The greater
the public identifies a trademark with a quality product, the more val-
uable the trademark becomes. 35 ° Wall Street has even placed "val-
ues" on trademarks by measuring the "brand equity" of a mark.351
Brand equity reflects the financial value of a brand's reputation by
translating consumer loyalty and recognition of the brand's trademark
into dollars and cents.352 For example, because consumers are willing
347. See White Tower Sys., Inc. v. White Castle Sys. of Eating Houses Corp., 90
F.2d 67, 68 (6th Cir. 1937).
348. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. But see McCarthy, supra note
24, § 3:2 (observing that the identification function of marks does not mean that the
consumer must know the identity of the manufacturer or distributor of the goods and
that seeing the same mark on goods merely identifies to the buyer the fact that all
such goods come from a common, even though anonymous source). For example, the
Nike "swoosh" is used to identify the maker of the apparel as Nike. See Maria Mal-
lory, Pop Goes the Pepsi Generation: A Struggling Pepsi-Cola Offers a Cautionary
Tale in Brand Stewardship, U.S. News & World Rep., June 16, 1997, at 48, 49.
350. See John Kimelman, Free Tony the Tiger, Fin. World, Sept. 1, 1993, at 50, 50
(stating that "the values of brands ... [are] created in large part as a direct result of
the companies' advertising campaigns over the years").
351. See Mallory, supra note 349, at 48-49. Although in the United States, the
value assigned to the brands, which are intangible assets, cannot be accounted for in
the financial statements, the brand values are accounted for in the United Kingdom.
See Alexandra Ourusoff, What's in a Name: The Methodology, Fin. World, Sept. 1,
1992, at 46, 46-47.
352. See Mallory, supra note 349, at 49. Although valuation techniques differ
among analysts, one commonly employed method requires a determination of the
total brand sales. See Alexandra Ourusoff et al., What's in a Name? What the World's
Top Brands Are Worth, Fin. World, Sept. 1, 1992, at 32, 34. From this figure, the cost
of the goods sold, general and administrative expenses, and depreciation are all sub-
tracted, leaving only operating profits. See id. Subtracted from the operating profits is
an amount equal to what could be earned with a plain generic version of the product.
See id. Applied to this resulting figure is an appropriate tax rate to reach the net
brand profits. See id. Then a multiple-based on such factors as global reach, market
leadership, and stability-is applied to determine the value of the brand. See id. For a
more in-depth view on different ways to measure brand equity, see generally Paul
Dyson et al., Understanding, Measuring, and Using Brand Equity, J. Advertising Res.,
Nov. 21, 1996, at 9.
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to pay upwards to $150 for a pair of sneakers with a "swoosh" on it,
Nike's brand equity is estimated at $7.3 billion.353
A corporation's stock price is affected by the corporation's brand
equity.354 A strong brand trademark is essential to capture a larger
share of the market, both at home and abroad.355 When new compa-
nies enter foreign markets, one of the first orders of business is to
flood the market with the brand's trademark so that consumers can
become loyal to the product.356 A strong brand equity also helps
maintain sales when price wars ensue, competition becomes fierce, or
the economy slows down.357 Furthermore, a strong brand name al-
lows a company to use the value embedded in the brand name to gain
easier access to capital. 8
If the mark is truly offensive to a great number of people, consum-
ers will simply refuse to purchase the product.35 9 Also, consumers are
free to write letters, "erect signs, carry placards, or publish advertise-
ments" in protest of any offensive trademark.36 The proper response
to offensive speech is not censorship, but counter-speech.-' The mar-
ketplace of ideas, as well as the marketplace of commercial products,
will eventually weed out trademarks that people find undesirable and
offensive.362 Because free market participants have a financial inter-
est in preserving trademarks through self-regulation, 3 there is no
353. See Mallory, supra note 349, at 49.
354. See Peter P. Conway, Jr., Protect Brand Equity in the Global Marketplace,
Best's Rev., Feb. 1998, at 81, 81 (stating that "8% of the variance in a company's stock
price is accounted for by corporate brand equity").
355. See Ourusoff et al., supra note 352, at 32-34.
356. See Michael K. Ozanian & Alexandra Ourusoff, Never Let Them See You
Sweat, F'm. World, Feb. 1, 1994, at 34, 35-38.
357. See Mallory, supra note 349, at 49.
358. See Ourusoff et al., supra note 352, at 46.
359. See Hornell Brewing Co. v. Brady, 819 F. Supp. 1227, 1237 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(finding that if a beer label is offensive to Native Americans, they would be discour-
aged from purchasing the product).
360. Sambo's of Ohio, Inc. v. City Council Toledo, 466 F. Supp. 177, 180 (N.D.
Ohio 1979).
361. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419 (1989) ("If there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence."); see also
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 577 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (applying the same reasoning to commercial speech).
362. As the Supreme Court noted, "the relationship of speech to the marketplace
of products or of services does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas."
Virginia State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
760 (1976) (quoting Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825-26 (1975)); see also supra
notes 242-43 and accompanying text. But see Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 597 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (finding that "although the 'marketplace of ideas' has a histori-
cally and sensibly defined context in the world of political speech, it has virtually none
in the realm of business transactions").
363. See supra notes 350-58 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of hav-
ing a strong mark).
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reason for the government to regulate trademarks except to protect
consumers from commercial harms.
CONCLUSION
The First Amendment guarantee of free speech must not be abro-
gated lightly.3 64 The commercial speech doctrine only allows the gov-
ernment to censure messages that perpetrate commercial harms.
When the government oversteps its bounds by using the commercial
speech doctrine as a cloak to quiet objectionable speech, the courts
must hold the government accountable and subject the regulation to
the strictest constitutional review.
364. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (1919)
("I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression
of opinions that we loathe .... ").
[Vol. 67
